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INFINITARY FIRST-ORDER CATEGORICAL LOGIC
Christian Esp´ındola
Abstract
We present a unified categorical treatment of completeness theorems for sev-
eral classical and intuitionistic infinitary logics with a proposed axiomatization.
This provides new completeness theorems and subsumes previous ones by Go¨del,
Kripke, Beth, Karp, Joyal, Makkai and Fourman/Grayson. As an application we
prove, using large cardinals assumptions, the disjunction and existence properties
for infinitary intuitionistic first-order logics.
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1 Introduction
A very natural and fundamental problem in mathematical logic is the determination
of the precise set of axioms that are enough to guarantee the completeness property
of a certain logic. That is, to axiomatize the logic in question so that there is a rela-
tion between semantic validity and syntactic provability. For classical and intuitionistic
first-order and propositional logic the answers are known. As soon as the expressive
power of the logic increases, proving a completeness theorem usually requires a stronger
metatheory, often relying on set-theoretical assumptions. For example, completeness
theorems for infinitary classical logic are known to depend on the addition of large cardi-
nal axioms in the metatheory. In this work, we plan to consider infinitary intuitionistic
logics in full generality, and to provide axiomatizations and completeness theorems.
Unlike the common techniques used to establish completeness, the main insight we will
follow is to establish a general framework within categorical logic that results adequate
for the development of infinitary languages. Building on previous work by Karp [Kar64]
and Makkai [Mak90], we will see that this setting is precisely that of infinitary first-
order categorical logic. The unifying power of category-theoretic language provided
the right means to subsume and amalgamate the existing completeness theorems in a
unique framework, where new completeness results branch out, combining aspects of
categorical logic, sheaf theory, model theory and set theory.
Completeness theorems for classical propositional logic were developed by Hilbert and
Ackermann, and extended to the classical first-order case by Go¨del in his doctoral dis-
sertation [Go¨d30]. For intuitionistic logic the completeness in terms of the semantic of
possible worlds was introduced by Kripke in [Kri65]. Meanwhile, completeness of infini-
tary logics was obtained by Karp in the monograph [Kar64], where systems for classical
infinitary propositional and first-order logic have been described and studied extensively
with Hilbert-type systems (see also [MT61] for a related development with Gentzen’s
sequents). Nadel developed infinitary intuitionistic propositional logic for countable
many conjunctions/disjunctions in [Nad78], proving completeness with respect to the
infinitary version of Kripke semantics. On the other hand, Makkai considered infinitary
regular theories in [Mak90] together with a corresponding completeness theorem.
Makkai’s work has a great deal of categorical logic, a subject prominent since the sev-
enties, when the school of Montre´al introduced the discipline exploiting the techniques
of category theory to study logical theories. The philosophy of theories as categories
had reached its climax in the work of Makkai and Reyes [MR77] (1977), where the
authors discuss an extensive treatment of categorical logic for first-order theories, and
include some infinitary versions. We intend to provide the jump from Makkai’s regular
case in [Mak90] to the first-order case by means of a completeness theorem for infini-
tary coherent logic, which together with a generalization of an unpublished theorem of
A. Joyal will allow us to derive completeness for infinitary intuitionistic propositional
and first-order logics, in terms of infinitary Kripke semantics, as well as sheaf and cat-
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egorical models. Unlike classical infinitary logics, whose related completeness results
have been known for decades, the main difficulty in studying infinitary intuitionistic
logics is the huge variety of non-equivalent formulas that one can obtain. This, as we
will show, suggests the introduction of large cardinal axioms appropriate to handle this
unexpected richness that one gets by dropping the excluded middle.
Instead of relying on Henkin’s method of adding constants, which encounters some
problems in the infinitary case, the way that we will prove completeness relies on ma-
nipulating sheaf models for infinitary logics (these are explained for example in [BJ98]).
The expert will however find that the methods here developed are a refinement of those
of Henkin, in the sense that instead of introducing witnessing constants for existential
sentences, they will indirectly appear naturally as a result of forcing statements in our
way to building models for the theory. The key contribution is the identification of the
transfinite transitivity property as the correct categorical counterpart of the axiomatic
treatment proposed. This property is a generalization of the transitivity property for
Grothendieck topologies, and plays an essential roˆle in the completeness proof.
The structure of this work is as follows. In the first part we introduce a system for
infinitary intuitionistic logic and we prove that the addition of the axiom of excluded
middle results in a system equivalent to Karp’s classical system. The second part
deals with the categorical counterpart of this type of logic, and introduces many of
the developments of categorical logic generalized to the infinitary case; it also contains
completeness proofs for infinitary intuitionistic logic in terms of sheaf and more general
categorical models. The third part contains the proof of completeness of infinitary in-
tuitionistic logic with respect to Kripke semantics (a generalization of Joyal’s theorem)
relying on a large cardinal hypothesis and on a completeness theorem for infinitary
coherent logic. Along the way we prove an infinitary version of completeness for Beth
semantics. We derive also Karp completeness theorem from ours, as well as Makkai’s
and Fourman/Grayson’s. When restricting to the finitary case, these theorems reduce
to the completeness theorems of Go¨del, Kripke, Beth, and the completeness of the
regular and coherent fragment of first-order logic, providing thus new proofs for all of
them.
1.1 Karp’s system
Infinitary languages Lκ,λ are defined according to the length of infinitary conjunc-
tions/disjunctions as well as quantification it allows. In that way, assuming a supply of
κ variables to be interpreted as ranging over a nonempty domain, one includes in the
inductive definition of formulas an infinitary clause for conjunctions and disjunctions,
namely, whenever the ordinal indexed sequence A0, ..., Aδ , ... of formulas has length less
than κ, one can form the infinitary conjunction/disjunction of them to produce a for-
mula. Analogously, whenever an ordinal indexed sequence of variables has length less
than λ, one can introduce one of the quantifiers ∀ or ∃ together with the sequence of
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variables in front of a formula to produce a new formula. One also stipulates that κ be
a regular cardinal, so that the length of any well-formed formula is less than κ itself.
It is then a natural question to ask for which of these infinitary languages one can
provide a notion of provability for which a form of completeness theorem can be proven,
in terms, for example, of the obvious Tarskian semantics associated to them. In [Kar64],
Karp proves completeness theorems for the classical logic Lκ,κ, for inaccessible κ, within
a Hilbert-style system including the distributivity and the dependent choice axioms.
These axioms consist of the following schemata:
1. A // [B //A]
2. [A // [B // C] // [[A //B] // [A // C]]]
3. [¬B // ¬A] // [A //B]
4. [
∧
i<α[A
//Ai]] // [A //
∧
i<αAi]
5. [
∧
i<αAi]
//Aj
6. [∀x[A //B] // [A // ∀xB]]
provided no variable in x occurs free in A;
7. ∀xA // Sf (A)
where Sf (A) is a substitution based on a function f from x to the terms of the
language;
8. Equality axioms:
(a) t = t
(b) [
∧
i<α ti = t
′
i]
// [φ(t0, ..., tξ , ...) = φ(t
′
0, ..., t
′
ξ , ...)]
(c) [
∧
i<α ti = t
′
i]
// [P (t0, ..., tξ , ...) // P (t
′
0, ..., t
′
ξ , ...)]
for each α < κ, where t, ti are terms and φ is a function symbol of arity α
and P a relation symbol of arity α;
9. Classical distributivity axiom1:
∧
i<γ
∨
j<γ
ψij //
∨
f∈γγ
∧
i<γ
ψif(i)
1Throughout this work the notation αβ for ordinals α, β will always denote the set of functions
f : β // α, and should not be confused with ordinal exponentiation.
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10. Classical dependent choice axiom:
∧
α<γ
∀β<αxβ∃xαψα // ∃α<γxα
∧
α<γ
ψα
provided the sets xα are pairwise disjoint and no variable in xα is free in ψβ for
β < α.
The inference rules are modus ponens, conjunction introduction and generalization.
In the same way that for finitary languages proofs are finitary objects, the right
metatheory to study formal proofs of infinitary languages is that of sets hereditarily of
cardinal less than κ. Similarly, Go¨del numberings of finitary formulas can be generalized
to the infinitary case if one uses (not necessarily finite) ordinal numbers (see [Kar64]),
by considering one-to-one functions from the symbols of the language into κ. It is then
possible to consider Go¨del numbers of formulas and prove that they correspond to those
sets hereditarily of cardinal less than κ that satisfy a precise ordinary predicate in a
certain metalanguage. Moreover, Go¨del numbers of provable formulas must satisfy a
precise provability predicate in such metalanguage.
The development of [Kar64] is classical, that is, the infinitary systems considered for-
malize infinitary classical logic. Intuitionistic systems of infinitary logic using countable
many conjunctions and disjunctions was studied in [Nad78]. Our purpose here is to
study systems for the intuitionistic general case, together with corresponding complete-
ness theorems.
1.2 Infinitary first-order systems
Let κ be an inaccessible cardinal (we consider ω to be inaccessible as well, so that
our account embodies in particular the finitary case). The syntax of intuitionistic κ-
first-order logics Lκ,κ consists of a (well-ordered) set of sorts and a set of function and
relation symbols, these latter together with the corresponding type, which is a subset
with less than κ many sorts. Therefore, we assume that our signature may contain
relation and function symbols on γ < κ many variables, and we suppose there is a
supply of κ many fresh variables of each sort. Terms and atomic formulas are defined
as usual, and general formulas are defined inductively according to the following:
Definition 1.2.1. If φ,ψ, {φα : α < γ} (for each γ < κ) are formulas of Lκ,κ, the
following are also formulas:
∧
α<γ φα,
∨
α<γ φα, φ
// ψ, ∀α<γxαφ (also written ∀xγφ
if xγ = {xα : α < γ}), ∃α<γxαφ (also written ∃xγφ if xγ = {xα : α < γ}).
The inductive definition of formulas allows to place them in hierarchies or levels up
to κ. Formulas in a successor level are built using the clauses of the definition from
formulas in the previous level, while at limit levels one takes the union of all formulas
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in all levels so far defined. Proofs by induction on the complexity of the formula are
proofs by transfinite induction on the least level of the formulas.
The infinitary systems that we will use in categorical logic for our purposes have all
the rules of finitary first-order logic, except that in the case of Lκ,κ we allow infinite sets
of variables as contexts of the sequents. Since the variables of each sort are assumed
to in correspondence with (the elements of) κ, each subset of variables comes with
an inherited well-order, which we will assume as given when we quantify over sets of
variables. There are two special types of formulas that one can consider. One is the
class of κ-regular formulas (see [Mak90]), which are those build of atomic formulas, κ-
conjunctions and κ-existential quantification. Adding κ-disjunction results in the class
of κ-coherent formulas. We shall introduce both of these in more detail later.
We use sequent style calculus to formulate the axioms of first-order logic, as can be
found, e.g., in [Joh02], D1.3. The system for κ-first order logic is described below.
Its key feature and the difference with the system of Karp essentially resides, besides
being an intuitionistic system, in the introduction of the transfinite transitivity rule,
which, as we shall see, is an intuitionistic way of merging the classical distributivity and
dependent choice axioms. The intuitive meaning of this rule will be further explained
after the following:
Definition 1.2.2. The system of axioms and rules for κ-first-order logic consists of
1. Structural rules:
(a) Identity axiom:
φ ⊢x φ
(b) Substitution rule:
φ ⊢x ψ
φ[s/x] ⊢y ψ[s/x]
where y is a string of variables including all variables occurring in the string
of terms s.
(c) Cut rule:
φ ⊢x ψ ψ ⊢x θ
φ ⊢x θ
2. Equality axioms:
(a)
⊤ ⊢x x = x
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(b)
(x = y) ∧ φ ⊢z φ[y/x]
where x, y are contexts of the same length and type and z is any context
containing x, y and the free variables of φ.
3. Conjunction axioms and rules:
∧
i<γ
φi ⊢x φj
{φ ⊢x ψi}i<γ
φ ⊢x
∧
i<γ
ψi
for each cardinal γ < κ.
4. Disjunction axioms and rules:
φj ⊢x
∨
i<γ
φi
{φi ⊢x θ}i<γ∨
i<γ
φi ⊢x θ
for each cardinal γ < κ.
5. Implication rule:
φ ∧ ψ ⊢x θ
φ ⊢x ψ // θ
===========
6. Existential rule:
φ ⊢xy ψ
∃yφ ⊢x ψ
=========
where no variable in y is free in ψ.
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7. Universal rule:
φ ⊢xy ψ
φ ⊢x ∀yψ
=========
where no variable in y is free in φ.
8. Transfinite transitivity rule:
φf ⊢yf
∨
g∈γβ+1,g|β=f
∃xgφg β < γ, f ∈ γ
β
φf ⊣⊢yf
∧
α<β
φf |α β < γ, limit β, f ∈ γ
β
φ∅ ⊢y∅
∨
f∈γγ
∃β<γxf |β+1
∧
β<γ
φf |β
for each cardinal γ < κ, where yf is the canonical context of φf , provided that,
for every f ∈ γβ+1, FV (φf ) = FV (φf |β )∪ xf and xf |β+1 ∩FV (φf |β ) = ∅ for any
β < γ, as well as FV (φf ) =
⋃
α<β FV (φf |α) for limit β. Note that we assume
that there is a fixed well-ordering of γγ for each γ < κ.
In this formulation the double line indicates a bidirectional rule. Note that the axiom
(schema) of excluded middle, which is not assumed here, is ⊤ ⊢x φ∨¬φ. Note also that
in full infinitary first-order logic we can dispense with the use of sequents and treat
φ ⊢x ψ as simply ∀x(φ // ψ). Conversely, any formula φ(x) can be interpreted as the
sequent ⊤ ⊢x φ, thereby obtaining a translation with Hilbert style systems.
In κ-first-order logic the following two axioms are provable:
1. Small distributivity axiom
φ ∧
∨
i<γ
ψi ⊢x
∨
i<γ
φ ∧ ψi
for each cardinal γ < κ.
2. Frobenius axiom:
φ ∧ ∃yψ ⊢x ∃y(φ ∧ ψ)
where no variable in y is in the context x.
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However, when working in smaller fragments without implication (like the κ-coherent
fragment to be introduced later) they need to be included as they are not derivable (for
the small distributivity axiom this can be seen for example in the propositional case
by considering non-distributive lattices satisfying all other axioms, and a similar idea
works for Frobenius axiom considering categorical semantics).
The transfinite transitivity rule can be understood as follows. Consider γ≤γ , the γ-
branching tree of height γ, i.e., the poset of functions f : β // γ for β ≤ γ with the
order given by inclusion. Suppose there is an assignment of formulas φf to each node
f of γ≤γ . Then the rule expresses that if the assignment is done in a way that the
formula assigned to each node entails the join of the formulas assigned to its immediate
successors, and if the formula assigned to a node in a limit level is equivalent to the
meet of the formulas assigned to its predecessors, then the formula assigned to the root
entails the join of the formulas assigned to the nodes in level γ.
There is also a version of the deduction theorem that holds here:
Lemma 1.2.3. Let Σ be a set of sequents and let σ be a sentence. If the theory
Σ∪{⊤ ⊢ σ} derives the sequent φ ⊢x ψ, then the theory Σ derives the sequent φ∧σ ⊢x ψ.
Proof. Straightforward induction on the length of the derivation.
In full first-order logic the transfinite transitivity rule can be replaced by the axiom
schema, for each γ < κ:
∧
f∈γβ ,β<γ
∀(yf \ y∅)

φf // ∨
g∈γβ+1,g|β=f
∃xgφg


∧
∧
β<γ, limit β,f∈γβ
∀(yf \ y∅)

φf ↔ ∧
α<β
φf |α


⊢y∅ φ∅
//
∨
f∈γγ
∃β<γxf |β+1
∧
β<γ
φf |β .
There are two particular cases of the transfinite transitivity rule which are of interest:
1. Distributivity rule:
φf ⊢x
∨
g∈γβ+1,g|β=f
φg β < γ, f ∈ γ
β
φf ⊣⊢x
∧
α<β
φf |α β < γ, limit β, f ∈ γ
β
φ∅ ⊢x
∨
f∈γγ
∧
β<γ
φf |β
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for each γ < κ (we assume that there is a fixed well-ordering of γγ for each γ < κ).
2. Dependent choice rule:
φβ ⊢yβ ∃xβ+1φβ+1 β < γ
φβ ⊣⊢yβ
∧
α<β
φα β ≤ γ, limit β
φ∅ ⊢y∅ ∃β<γxβ+1φγ
for each γ < κ, where yβ is the canonical context of φβ, provided that, for every
f ∈ γβ+1, FV (φf ) = FV (φf |β )∪ xf and xf |β+1 ∩FV (φf |β ) = ∅ for any β < γ, as
well as FV (φf ) =
⋃
α<β FV (φf |α) for limit β.
Again, if implication and universal quantification are available in the fragment we are
considering, we can instead replace the distributivity and dependent choice rules by
axiom schemata expressible with single sequents, for each γ < κ:
∧
f∈γβ ,β<γ

φf // ∨
g∈γβ+1,g|β=f
φg


∧
∧
β<γ, limit β,f∈γβ

φf ↔ ∧
α<β
φf |α

 ⊢x φ∅ // ∨
f∈γγ
∧
β<γ
φf |β
and
∧
β<γ
∀(yβ \ y∅) (φβ // ∃xβ+1φβ+1)
∧
∧
β≤γ, limit β
∀(yβ \ y∅)

φβ ↔ ∧
α<β
φα

 ⊢y∅ φ∅ // ∃α<γxαφγ .
In turn, the rule of dependent choice has as a particular case the rule of choice:
φ ⊢x
∧
β<γ
∃xβφβ
φ ⊢x ∃β<γxβ
∧
β<γ
φβ
where the xβ are disjoint canonical contexts of the φβ . This can be seen by applying
dependent choice to the formulas ψβ = φ ∧
∧
α<β φα+1.
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Lemma 1.2.4. All instances of the classical distributivity axiom:
∧
i<γ
∨
j<γ
ψij ⊢x
∨
f∈γγ
∧
i<γ
ψif(i)
are derivable from those of the axiom:
∧
f∈γβ ,β<γ

φf // ∨
g∈γβ+1,g|β=f
φg


∧
∧
β<γ, limit β,f∈γβ

φf ↔ ∧
α<β
φf |α

 ⊢x φ∅ // ∨
f∈γγ
∧
β<γ
φf |β .
Moreover, if excluded middle is available and κ is inaccessible, the converse holds.
Proof. Assign to the nodes of the tree γ<γ the following formulas: to the immediate
succesors of a node φf , for f ∈ γ
β, assign the formulas ψβj , then set φ∅ = ⊤, and
φf =
∧
α<β φf |α for f ∈ γ
β and limit β. Then we have the axiom
∧
i<γ
∨
j<γ ψij ⊢x∨
g∈γβ+1,g|β=f
φg for each f , from which we can further derive:∧
i<γ
∨
j<γ
ψij ⊢x φf //
∨
g∈γβ+1,g|β=f
φg
for each f . Thus, applying the distributivity and the cut rule we get:
∧
i<γ
∨
j<γ
ψij ⊢x
∨
f∈γγ
∧
i<γ
ψif(i)
as we wanted.
If excluded middle is available, we have ⊤ ⊢x
∧
f∈γβ ,β<γ(φf ∨ ¬φf ). If I = {f ∈
γβ, β < γ}, the distributivity axiom implies that then ⊤ ⊢x
∨
g∈2I
∧
f∈I ag(φf ), where
ag(φf ) = φf if g(f) = 0 and ag(φf ) = ¬φf if g(f) = 1. We have therefore:
φ∅ ≡
∨
g∈2I

φ∅ ∧ ∧
f∈I
ag(φf )

 .
If φ∅ ∧
∧
f∈I ag(φf ) is not equivalent to ⊥, ag(φ∅) = φ∅, and hence φ∅ is the join:∨
φ∅∧
∧
f∈I ag(φf )6≡⊥
∧
f∈I
ag(φf ).
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We will prove that each disjunct in this join entails
∨
f∈I
∧
β<γ φf |β , which is clearly
enough. Take one such disjunct, b =
∧
f∈I ag(φf ) 6≡ ⊥ for a certain g. First, notice
that since ⊤ ⊢x φf //
∨
h∈γβ+1,h|β=f
φh, if b ⊢x φf then b ∧ φh 6≡ ⊥ for at least one h,
in which case it follows that ag(φh) = φh and hence b ⊢x φh. With this observation,
we can inductively define a path f ∈ γγ such that b ⊢x φf |α for each α < γ. Thus,
b ⊢x
∨
f∈γγ
∧
β<γ φf |β , as we wanted. This finishes the proof.
Remark 1.2.5. The intuitionistic form of the distributivity law is strictly stronger than
the classical version. For example, the interval [0, 1] with the supremum and infimum
as join and meet, respectively, satisfies the classical distributivity law for every γ < κ,
but the intuitionistic distributivity law fails for γ = ω1.
Note that the distributivity rule implies in particular, due to Lemma 1.2.4, the small
distributivity axiom, which is a particular case of classical distributivity.
Lemma 1.2.6. All instances of the classical dependent choice axiom:
∧
α<γ
∀β<αxβ∃xαψα ⊢x ∃α<γxα
∧
α<γ
ψα
are derivable from those of the axiom:
∧
β<γ
∀(yβ \ y∅) (φβ // ∃xβ+1φβ+1)
∧
∧
β≤γ, limit β
(yβ \ y∅)

φβ ↔ ∧
α<β
φα

 ⊢y∅ φ∅ // ∃α<γxαφγ .
Moreover, if excluded middle is available, the converse holds.
Proof. Define the following formulas: set φ∅ = (x = x), φβ+1 = ψβ and φα =
∧
β<α φβ
if α is a limit ordinal. Then we have:
∧
α<γ
∀β<αxβ∃xαψα ⊢yβ ∃xβφβ+1
and in particular,
∧
α<γ
∀β<αxβ∃xαψα ⊢yβ φβ
// ∃xβφβ+1.
Taking universal quantification and conjunctions on the right side, together with the
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sentence
∧
β≤γ, limit β ∀(yβ \ y∅)
(
φβ ↔
∧
α<β φα
)
, we can then use dependent choice
and the cut rule to get:
∧
α<γ
∀β<αxβ∃xαψα ⊢x (x = x) // ∃α<γxα
∧
α<γ
ψα,
as desired.
If excluded middle is available, notice that we have:
∀(yβ \ y∅) (φβ // ∃xβ+1φβ+1) ⊢y∅ ∀(yβ \ y∅)∃xβ+1 (φβ
// φβ+1)
for β < γ by the independence of premise principle, classically provable. Taking con-
junctions and applying classical dependent choice and the cut rule, we get:
∧
β<γ
∀(yβ \ y∅) (φβ // ∃xβ+1φβ+1) ⊢y∅ ∃α<γxα
∧
β<γ
(φβ // φβ+1)
Since we also have
∧
β≤γ, limit β
∀(yβ\y∅)

φβ ↔ ∧
α<β
φα

∧∃α<γxα ∧
β<γ
(φβ // φβ+1) ⊢y∅ φ∅
//∃α<γxα
∧
β<γ
φβ
the result follows.
We have seen that the transfinite transitivity rule implies both classical distributivity
and classical dependent choice. We will see now that if excluded middle is available,
the converse holds:
Theorem 1.2.7. Assuming excluded middle, if κ is inaccessible, all the instances of
the transfinite transitivity rule:
φf ⊢yf
∨
g∈γβ+1,g|β=f
∃xgφg β < γ, f ∈ γ
β
φf ⊣⊢yf
∧
α<β
φf |α β < γ, limit β, f ∈ γ
β
φ∅ ⊢y∅
∨
f∈γγ
∃β<γxf |β+1
∧
β<γ
φf |β
are derivable from instances of the classical distributivity axiom:
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∧
i<γ
∨
j<γ
ψij ⊢x
∨
f∈γγ
∧
i<γ
ψif(i)
and the classical dependent choice axiom:
∧
α<γ
∀β<αxβ∃xαψα ⊢x ∃α<γxα
∧
α<γ
ψα.
In particular, the addition to the axiom of excluded middle to the system of κ-first-order
logic results in a system equivalent to Karp’s.
Proof. If φf ⊢yf
∨
g∈γβ+1,g|β=f
∃xgφg for each β < γ, f ∈ γ
β, then we can derive, using
the independence of premise principle, the sequent:
⊤ ⊢y∅ ∀α<β(∪f∈γβxf |α+1)
∧
f∈γβ
∃g∈γβ+1,g|β=fxg

φf // ∨
g∈γβ+1,g|β=f
φg

 .
Using the rule of choice, derivable from that of dependent choice (which is in turn
classically derivable from classical dependent choice by Lemma 1.2.6), we get:
⊤ ⊢y∅ ∀α<β(∪f∈γβxf |α+1)∃(∪g∈γβ+1xg)
∧
f∈γβ

φf // ∨
g∈γβ+1,g|β=f
φg

 .
Since we have one such sequent for each β < γ, by classical dependent choice we can
thus infer:
⊤ ⊢y∅ ∃α<γ(∪f∈γγxf |α+1)
∧
β<γ,f∈γβ

φf // ∨
g∈γβ+1,g|β=f
φg

 . (1)
On the other hand, by the distributivity property (provable by Lemma 1.2.4 from the
classical distributivity property, since excluded middle is available), we have:
∧
β<γ,f∈γβ

φf // ∨
g∈γβ+1,g|β=f
φg

 ∧ ∧
β<γ, limit β,f∈γβ

φf ↔ ∧
α<β
φf |α


⊢y∅∪
⋃
α<γ,f∈γγ xf |α+1
φ∅ //
∨
f∈γγ
∧
β<γ
φf |β .
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Therefore, the sequent (1) together with the premises ⊤ ⊢y∅∪
⋃
α<γ,f∈γγ xf |α+1
φf ↔∧
α<β φf |α for β < γ, limit β, f ∈ γ
β, entail:
⊤ ⊢y∅ φ∅
// ∃α<γ(∪f∈γγxf |α+1)
∨
f∈γγ
∧
β<γ
φf |β
which in turn entails:
⊤ ⊢y∅ φ∅
//
∨
f∈γγ
∃β<γxf |β+1
∧
β<γ
φf |β .
This concludes the proof.
2 Infinitary first-order categorical logic
2.1 κ-coherent categories
We begin now to study the categorical counterpart of the infinitary systems. We start
with the following:
Definition 2.1.1. The κ-coherent fragment of κ-first-order logic is the fragment of
those sequents where formulas are κ-coherent, i.e., only use
∧
,
∨
, ∃, where the axioms
and rules of κ-first-order logic are restricted to instantiations on κ-coherent formulas
only, and where we add the corresponding instances of the small distributivity and the
Frobenius axioms.
The κ-coherent fragment of first-order logic, which is an extension of the usual finitary
coherent fragment, has a corresponding category which we are now going to define.
Following [Mak90], consider a κ-chain in a category C with κ-limits, i.e., a diagram
Γ : γop // C specified by morphisms (hβ,α : Cβ // Cα)α≤β<γ such that the restriction
Γ|β is a limit diagram for every limit ordinal β. We say that the morphisms hβ,α
compose transfinitely, and take the limit projection fβ,0 to be the transfinite composite
of hα+1,α for α < β.
Given a cardinal γ < κ, consider the tree T = γ<γ . We will consider diagrams
F : T op // C, which determine, for each node f , a family of arrows in C, {hg,f :
Cg //Cf |f ∈ γ
β , g ∈ γβ+1, g|β = f}. A κ-family of morphisms with the same codomain
is said to be jointly covering if the union of the images of the morphisms is the whole
codomain. We say that a diagram F : T op // C is proper if the {hg,f : f ∈ T} are
jointly covering and, for limit β, hf,∅ is the transfinite composition of the hf |α+1,f |α for
α + 1 < β. Given a proper diagram, we say that the families {hg,f : f ∈ T} compose
transfinitely, and refer to the projections {hg,∅|g ∈ γ
γ} as the transfinite composites
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of these families. If in a proper diagram the transfinite composites of the κ-families
of morphisms form itself a jointly covering family, we will say that the diagram is
completely proper.
Definition 2.1.2. A κ-coherent category is a κ-complete coherent category with κ-
complete subobject lattices where unions of cardinality less than κ are stable under
pullback, and where every proper diagram is completely proper, i.e., the transfinite
composites of jointly covering κ-families of morphisms form a jointly covering family.
The latter property, which is the categorical analogue of the transfinite transitivity
rule, can be considered as an exactness property of Set, generalizing the property
in [Mak90] where the families consisted of single morphisms. The transfinite tran-
sitivity property expresses that transfinite compositions of covering families (in the
Grothendieck topology given by the jointly covering families of less than κ-morphisms)
are again covering families; whence its name. It is easy to see that the property holds
in Set, and in fact in every presheaf category.
κ-coherent categories have an internal logic, in a signature containing one sort for
each object, no relation symbols and one unary function symbol for each arrow, and
axiomatized by the following sequents:
⊤ ⊢x IdX (x ) = x
for all objects X (here x is a variable of sort X);
⊤ ⊢x f(x) = h(g(x))
for all triples of arrows such that f = h◦g (here x is a variable whose sort is the domain
of f);
⊤ ⊢y ∃xf(x) = y
for all covers f (here x is a variable whose sort is the domain of f);
⊤ ⊢x
∨
i<γ
∃yimi(yi) = x
whenever the sort A of x is the union of γ subobjects mi : Ai֌ A (here yi is a variable
of sort Ai); ∧
i:I // J
i(xI) = xJ ⊢{xI :I∈I} ∃x
∧
I∈I
piI(x) = xI
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∧
I∈I
piI(x) = piI(y) ⊢x,y x = y
whenever there is a κ-small diagram Φ : I // C, ({CI}I∈I, {i : CI //CJ)}i:I // J) and
a limit cone pi : ∆C ⇒ Φ, (piI : C // CI)I∈I. Here xI is a variable of type CI , and x, y
are variables of type C.
Functors preserving this logic, i.e., κ-coherent functors, are just coherent functors
which preserve κ-limits and κ-unions of subobjects, and they can be easily seen to
correspond to structures of the internal theory in a given κ-coherent category, where
we use a straightforward generalization of categorical semantics, to be explained in the
next section.
2.2 Categorical semantics and Kripke-Joyal forcing
Categorical model theory techniques explore the study of models in arbitrary categories
besides the usual category of sets. Unlike classical model theory, the logics one uses for
this purpose formulate theories in terms of sequents; the type of theory studied depends
on the type of formula one encounters in these sequents. The theories of the fragments
mentioned so far all correspond to specific types of categories. We have the κ-regular
categories, which are categories with κ-limits, regular epimorphism-monomorphism fac-
torizations stable under pullback and where the transfinite composition of epimorphisms
is an epimorphism. The κ-coherent categories have, in addition to this, stable κ-unions
of subobjects and satisfy the property that the transfinite composition of jointly cov-
ering families is jointly covering. Finally, the κ-Heyting categories have, in addition,
right adjoint for pullback functors between subobject lattices, which makes interpreting
universal quantification possible.
There is a categorical semantics that one can associate with each type of category
and theory, which is usually defined according to some inductive clauses. Following
[Joh02], D1.2, given a category C, for each signature Σ of a first order language we can
associate the so called Σ-structure within C in a way that generalizes the Set-valued
interpretations to all κ-Heyting categories:
Definition 2.2.1. A Σ-structure in C consists of the following data:
1. for each sort A of variables in Σ there is a corresponding object M(A);
2. for each γ-ary function symbol f there is a morphism M(f) :M(A1, ..., Aα, ...) =
Πi<γM(Ai)→M(B);
3. for each γ-ary relation symbol R there is a subobject M(R)֌M(A1, ..., Aα, ...),
where Ai are the sorts corresponding to the individual variables corresponding to
R (which will specify, by definition, the type of R).
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The Σ-structure will serve as a setup for interpreting all formulas of the language
considered. Due to the need of distinguishing the context in which the free variables
of the formula occur, for the purpose of a correct interpretation, we shall adopt the
notation (x, φ) to represent a term/formula φ whose free variables occur within x =
x1, ..., xα, .... We now define the interpretation of such formulas by induction on their
complexity:
Definition 2.2.2. Given a term in context (x, s) of a κ-first order theory, its interpre-
tation [[x, s]] within the κ-Heyting category C is a morphism of C defined in the following
way:
1. If s is a variable, it is necessarily some xi, and then the corresponding morphism
is [[x, xi]] = pii :M(A0, ..., Aα, ...)→M(Ai), the i-th product projection.
2. If s is a term f(t0, ..., tα, ...), where each term tα is of type Cα, its interpretation
is the composite:
M(A0, ..., Aα, ...)
([[x,t0]],...,[[x,tα]],...) //M(C0, ..., Cα, ...)
M(f) //M(B)
The interpretation in C of the formula in context (x, φ), where x = x0...xα... and
xi is a variable of sort Ai, is defined as a subobject [[x, φ]] ֌ M(A0, ..., Aα, ...) in the
following way:
1. If φ is the formula R(t0, ..., tα, ...), where R is a γ-ary relation symbol of type
B0, ..., Bα, ..., then [[x, φ]] is given by the pullback:
[[x, φ]] //


M(R)


M(A0, ..., Aα, ...)
([[x,t1]],...,[[x,tα]],...) //M(B0, ..., Bα, ...)
2. If φ is the formula s = t where s, t are terms of sort B, then [[x, φ]] is the equalizer
of the arrows:
M(A0, ..., Aα, ...)
[[x,s]]
**
[[x,t]]
44M(B)
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Equivalently, [[x, φ]] is the pullback of the diagonal M(B)֌M(B)×M(B) along
the morphism ([[x, s]], [[x, t]]).
3. If φ is the formula
∨
i<γ ψi, then [[x, φ]] is the union
∨
i<γ [[x, ψi]] in
Sub(M(A0, ..., Aα, ...)). If φ is the formula
∧
i<γ ψi, then [[x, φ]] is the intersection∧
i<γ [[x, ψi]] in Sub(M(A0, ..., Aα, ...)). Similarly, if φ is the formula ¬ψ, the
corresponding subobject is ¬[[x, ψ]].
4. If φ is the formula (∃y)ψ, then [[x, φ]] is the image of the composite:
[[xy, ψ]] // //M(A0, ..., Aα, ..., B)
pi //M(A0, ..., Aα, ...)
where pi is the projection to the first γ coordinates. Equivalently, this amounts to
applying the left adjoint ∃pi to the pullback functor
pi−1 : Sub(M(A0, ..., Aα, ..., B)) // Sub(M(A0, ..., Aα, ...)).
5. If φ is the formula (∀y)ψ, then [[x, φ]] can be obtained by applying to [[xy, ψ]] the
right adjoint ∀pi to the pullback functor
pi−1 : Sub(M(A0, ..., Aα, ..., B)) //Sub(M(A0, ..., Aα, ...)), where pi is the projec-
tion to the first γ coordinates. Implication can be seen as a particular case of
this right adjoint, by considering in Sub(M(A0, ..., Aα, ...)) the pullback functor
φ ∧ − : Sub(M(A0, ..., Aα, ...)) // Sub(M(A0, ..., Aα, ...)).
Functors between the appropriate categories preserving the corresponding structure
correpond to models in the codomain category of the internal theory of the domain
category. Such functors are called conservative if they reflect isomorphisms, and hence
they reflect also the validity of formulas in the corresponding models.
One then has:
Lemma 2.2.3. κ-coherent logic is sound with respect to models in κ-coherent cate-
gories.
Proof. This is straightforward for all axioms and rules, except for the rule of transfinite
transitivity. But here the proof is the natural generalization of that of the soundness of
dependent choice, presented in [Mak90] for κ-regular logic. Let Syf be the product of
the sorts assigned to the variables in yf in the structure within a κ-coherent category,
and assume that the premises of the transfinite transitivity rule hold there. We must
show that the conclusion holds. We can also assume, without loss of generality, that:
φg ⊢yg φf
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for each g ∈ γβ+1, g|β = f ; otherwise we can take, for each f ∈ γ
β:
ψf =
∧
α≤β
φf |α
which, using the small distributivity law as well as Frobenius axiom can be seen to sat-
isfy the premises of the rule as well, and both this form of distributivity and Frobenius
axiom hold in any κ-coherent category because κ-unions and covers are stable under
pullback.
Let mα : Cα // Syf be the monomorphism representing the subobject [yf , φf ]. The
assumption we have provides arrows:
hg,f : Cg // Cf
for g ∈ γβ+1, g|β = f , and by interpreting the premises of the rule it follows that the
arrows:
{hg,f |g ∈ γ
β+1, g|α = f}
form a jointly covering family. For a fixed f ∈ γγ and limit β, the limit of the diagram
formed by the Cf |α for α < β is given by the intersection in the subobject lattice of
Syf |β
of the pullbacks of each mα along the projections pif |β ,f |α : Syf |β
// Syf |α . This
intersection is in turn given by the subobject:
Cf |β =
∧
α<β
φf |α
// Syf |β
By the property of the κ-coherent category, the arrows Cf |β
// C∅ for f ∈ γ
γ form
a jointly covering family whenever β is a limit ordinal, and the interpretation of the
conclusion of the rule is precisely this statement for the case β = γ. This proves the
soundness of the rule.
One particular case of categorical semantics is given by the so called Kripke-Joyal
semantics in a topos. A sheaf topos is in particular a Heyting category, and so it
will be κ-Heyting precisely when it satisfies the transfinite transitivity property. The
verification of the Heyting properties of a sheaf topos presents no major difficulties, but
it is instructive to point how the connectives and quantifiers are interpreted. Following
[MM94], section III.8, given a sheaf topos Sh(C, τ) and some subsheaves {A,B,Ai : i ∈
I} in the lattice of subobjects of a sheaf E, we have:
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1. The subsheaf 0, initial in Sub(E), is determined by the property x ∈ 0(C)⇔ ∅ is
a cover of C and x ∈ E(C).
2. The subsheaf
∧
i∈I Ai is determined by the property
∧
i∈I Ai(C) =
⋂
i∈I Ai(C).
3. The subsheaf
∨
i∈I Ai is determined by the property
2 e ∈
∨
i∈I Ai(C) ⇔ {f :
D // C/e.f ∈
⋃
i∈I Ai(D)} is a cover of C.
4. The subsheaf A → B is determined by the property e ∈ (A → B)(C) ⇔ for all
f : D // C, e ∈ A(D) implies e ∈ B(D).
5. Given a morphism φ : E //F inducing the pullback functor between subsheaves
φ−1 : Sub(F ) // Sub(E), the action of its left adjoint ∃φ is determined by the
property y ∈ ∃φ(A)(C) ⇔ {f : D // C/∃a ∈ A(D) : φD(a) = y.f} is a cover of
C.
6. Given a morphism φ : E //F inducing the pullback functor between subsheaves
φ−1 : Sub(F ) // Sub(E), the action of its right adjoint ∀φ is determined by the
property y ∈ ∀φ(A)(C)⇔ for all f : D // C, φ
−1
D (y.f) ⊆ A(D).
If we have a model of a theory in a sheaf topos and C is now any object from C,
the forcing relation C  φ(α) for α : [−, C] // [[x,⊤]] holds by definition if α factors
through the subobject [[x, φ(x)]]֌ [[x,⊤]]. From the previous clauses, one can see that
the following relations hold:
1. C  ⊥ ⇔ ∅ is a cover of C.
2. C 
∧
i∈I φi(α)⇔ C  φi(α) for every i ∈ I.
3. C 
∨
i∈I φi(α) ⇔ there is a cover {fj : Cj
// C}j∈J such that for every j ∈ J ,
Cj  φij (αfj) for some ij ∈ I (we say that the covering family witnesses the
forcing clause).
4. C  φ(α) // ψ(α)⇔ for all f : D // C, D  φ(αf) implies D  ψ(αf).
5. C  ∃xφ(x,α) ⇔ there is a cover {fj : Cj // C}j∈J such that for every j ∈ J ,
Cj  φ(cj,αfj) for some cj : Cj // [[x,⊤]] (we say that the covering family
witnesses the forcing clause).
6. C  ∀xφ(x,α)⇔ for all f : D // C and c : D // [[x,⊤]] we have D  φ(c,αf).
2For e ∈ E(C) and f : D // C, we denote by e.f ∈ E(D) the element E(f)(e).
21
(These last two clauses are obtained from the case in which the morphism φ is the
projection between the products of corresponding sorts). There are two important
properties of this forcing notion. First, it is clear that if C  φ(α) and f : D // C,
then D  φ(αf). The second property states that if {fi : Ci // C}i∈I is a cover of C
and Ci  φ(αfi) for all i ∈ I, then also C  φ(α). This is simply a reformulation of
the glueing condition for the subsheaf [[x, φ(x)]]֌ [[x,⊤]].
The Kripke-Joyal forcing and its properties will become useful in our proof of com-
pleteness of infinitary logics.
2.3 Syntactic categories
The development of syntactic categories for infinite quantifier logics follows precisely
the same pattern as the finitary case, except that instead of finite contexts for the
objects of the syntactic category of a theory over such logic, we allow arbitrary sets of
variables of cardinality less than κ, following, e.g., [Mak90].
Given a κ-coherent theory T, we explain how to define, following [Joh02], D1.4, its
syntatic category CT and a categorical modelMT inside it, in such a way that a formula
in T will be provable if and only if its interpretation in CT is satisfied by the modelMT.
Formulas shall be considered in suitable contexts, which are (possibly empty) subsets
of variables of cardinality less than κ containing the free variables of the formula. We
will say that two formulas in context (x, φ), (y, ψ) are α-equivalent if the second has
been obtained from the first after renaming the bound variables of φ and the variables
in the context (some of them appearing as free variables in φ). We take the objects
of CT to be the α-equivalence classes of formulas (x, φ). To describe the morphisms,
consider two objects [x, φ], [y, ψ], and assume, without loss of generality, that their set
of variables x,y are disjoint. Consider now a formula θ that satisfies the following
conditions:
a) Its free variables are amongst xy.
b) The following sequents are provable in T:
θ(x,y) ⊢xy φ(x) ∧ ψ(y)
φ(x) ⊢x ∃y(θ(x,y))
θ(x,y) ∧ θ(x, z/y) ⊢xyz (y = z)
Define now the morphisms between [x, φ] and [y, ψ] to be the provable-equivalence class
of all those formulas of T that satisfy conditions a) and b) above.
The idea behind this definition is to allow only those morphisms that are exactly
needed for our purposes. More precisely, the first formula in condition b) restricts
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the interpretation [[θ(x,y)]] in any model to be a subobject of [[φ(x) ∧ ψ(y)]], while
the last two formulas imply, if the category has finite limits, that it will be the graph
of a morphism from [[φ(x)]] to [[ψ(y)]]. Because of the particular construction of the
category CT, this says exactly that the class [xy, θ(x,y)] is a morphism from [x, φ(x)]
to [y, ψ(y)].
The composite of two morphisms:
[x, φ]
[xy,θ] // [y, ψ]
[yz,δ] // [z, η]
is defined to be the class [xz,∃y(θ ∧ δ)]. It can be verified that this definition does not
depend on the choice of representatives θ, δ and that this morphism so defined satisfies
conditions a) and b) above. It can also be verified that composition of morphisms is
associative. Finally, the identity morphism on an object [x, φ] can be defined to be
arrow:
[x, φ]
[xy,φ(x)∧(x=y)] // [y, φ(y/x)]
Again, it is easily checked that this morphism satisfies condition a) and b) and that it
is the unity for composition. Also, note that these definitions do not depend on the
choices of representatives in each class. This makes CT a small category.
Our goal is to relate syntactical provability in T with semantic validity in the cate-
gorical model MT to be defined. One aspect of this relation is given by the following
lemma, which highlights the syntactical properties of CT:
Lemma 2.3.1. 1) A morphism [xy, θ] : [x, φ] → [y, ψ] is an isomorphism if and only
if [yx, θ] : [y, ψ] → [x, φ] is a valid morphism in CT (i.e., it satisfies conditions a) and
b) of the definition of morphism).
2) A morphism [xy, θ] : [x, φ] → [y, ψ] is a monomorphism if and only if the sequent
θ(x,y) ∧ θ(z,y) ⊢xyz x = z) is provable in T.
3) Every subobject of [y, φ] is isomorphic to one of the form:
[x, ψ] //
[ψ∧(x=y)] // [y, φ]
where ψ is such that the sequent ψ(y) ⊢y φ(y) is provable in T. Moreover, any two
subobjects [y, ψ], [y, η] in Sub([y, φ]) satisfy [y, ψ] ≤ [y, η] if and only if the sequent
ψ(y) ⊢y η(y) is provable in T.
Proof. To prove 1), suppose [yx, θ] is a valid morphism from [y, ψ] to [x, φ]. Then
it can be easily checked that [yx, θ] itself is an inverse for [xy, θ]. Conversely, if
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[xy, θ] : [x, φ] → [y, ψ] has an inverse [yx, δ] (which is a valid morphism), then it
can be verified that θ and δ are necessarily provable equivalent in T, from which the
result follows.
To prove 2), construct the kernel pair of [xy, θ] : [x, φ] → [y, ψ], which, using the
construction of products and equalizers, can be verified to be the class [xz,∃y(θ(x,y)∧
θ(z,y))]. Then, as can be easily checked, the provability of the stated sequent is equiv-
alent, by 1), to the fact that the diagonal morphism from [x, φ] to this kernel pair is
an isomorphism, which is in turn equivalent to the fact that [xy, θ] is a monomorphism.
Finally, suppose we have a monomorphism [xy, θ] : [x, ψ] ֌ [y, φ]. By 1), the mor-
phism [xy, θ] : [x, ψ] → [y,∃xθ(x,y)] is an isomorphism. Then, composing its inverse
with the original monomorphism we have a subobject of the stated form, where ψ(y) is
the formula ∃xθ(x,y). Now, two subobjects [y, ψ], [y, η] of [y, φ] satisfy [y, ψ] ≤ [y, η]
if and only if there exists a monomorphism [y, ψ]֌ [y, η], which by the previous argu-
ment must have the form [ψ′ ∧ (x = y)] : [x, ψ′]֌ [y, η] for some ψ′. But then, since ψ
and ψ′ must be provable equivalent, this is a valid morphism if and only if the sequent
ψ(y) ⊢y η(y) is provable in T. This completes the proof of 3).
To construct the desired model MT in the syntactic category of T, note that there is
a natural Σ-structure assigning to the sort A the formula [x,⊤] where x is a variable of
sort A, and to the relation symbols R over variables x = x1, ..., xα, ... of sorts A,..., Aα, ...
respectively, the subobject [x, R(x1, ..., xα, ...)]֌ [x,⊤]. We have now finally gotten to
the important relationship between syntactic provability and semantic validity in MT:
Proposition 2.3.2. The sequent φ(x) ⊢x ψ(x) is satisfied by the Σ-structure MT if
and only if it is provable in T. Consequently, a formula η(x) has full extension in MT
if and only if it is provable in T.
Proof. By definition, the stated sequent is satisfied byMT if and only if the correspond-
ing subobjects in the interpretation satisfy [[x, φ]] ≤ [[x, ψ]]. By the construction of MT,
a straightforward induction on the complexity of φ proves that the interpretation [[x, φ]]
is the subobject [x, φ] ֌ [x,⊤]. Therefore, the assertion [[x, φ]] ≤ [[x, ψ]] is equivalent
to the fact that the two subobjects [x, φ], [x, ψ] of [x,⊤] satisfy [x, φ] ≤ [x, ψ], which,
by Lemma 2.3.1 3), is in turn equivalent to the fact that φ(x) ⊢x ψ(x) is provable in
T.
Proposition 2.3.2 says in a way that the model MT reflects all syntactical relations in
the theory T; therefore, the analysis of categorical properties of MT will reveal facts
about provability in T.
We now have:
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Proposition 2.3.3. If T is a κ-coherent (resp. κ-Heyting) theory, then CT is a κ-
coherent (resp. κ-Heyting) category.
Proof. To prove CT has κ-limits it suffices to prove it has κ-products and equalizers.
As the product of γ-many objects [xi, φi]i<γ (where the xi are assumed to be disjoint)
we can take the class [
⋃
i<γ xi,
∧
i<γ φi] together with the projections indicated below:
[z, χ]
[z∪(
⋃
i<γ xi),
∧
j<γ θj ]
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
[zx′
j
,θj ]
**❯❯❯
❯❯❯
❯❯❯
❯❯❯
❯❯❯
❯❯❯
❯❯❯
❯❯❯
❯❯❯
❯❯❯
❯❯❯
❯❯❯
❯❯❯
❯❯❯
❯
[
⋃
i<γ xi,
∧
i<γ φi] [
⋃
i<γ xix
′
j
,
∧
i<γ φi∧(x
′
j
=xj)]
// [x′j, φj ]
Given morphisms [zx′j, θj ], the induced morphism into the product is given by the class
[z ∪ (
⋃
i<γ xi),
∧
j<γ θj], since it can be easily verified that this is the only morphism
that makes the diagram commute.
For the equalizer of a parallel pair of morphisms [xy, θ], [xy, δ], we take:
[x′,∃y(θ(x′,y) ∧ δ(x′,y))]
[x′x,∃y(θ∧δ∧(x′=x))] // [x, φ]
[xy,θ]
))
[xy,δ]
55 [y, ψ]
[z, χ]
[zx,η]
66♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠
[zx′,η]
OO✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
✤
and the universal property is satisfied with the indicated induced morphism. This
proves that CT has κ-limits. Note as well that there is an initial object given by [{},⊥],
and a terminal object given by [{},⊤].
To prove that the category has image factorizations, given a morphism [xy, θ] :
[x, φ] → [y, ψ] we take its image as the subobject [y,∃x(θ)] ֌ [y, ψ]. In particu-
lar, [xy, θ] is a cover if and only if the sequent ψ(y) ⊢y ∃xθ(x,y) is provable in T.
Then, from the construction of limits above, it can be verified straightforwardly using
Frobenius axiom that covers are stable under pullbacks. To prove that the category
has unions, take subobjects [x, φi]i<γ of [x, φ] and define their union to be [x,
∨
i<γ φi];
the small distributivity law then ensures that unions are stable under pullback.
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The validity of the transfinite transitivity property is proven using the transfinite
transitivity rule, the construction of limits and the fact that ([xiy, θi] : [xi, φi] →
[y, ψ])i<γ are jointly covering if and only if the sequent ψ(y) ⊢y
∨
i<γ ∃xiθi(xi,y)
is provable in T. It is necessary to compute the limit of a κ-chain ([xα+1xα, θα] :
[xα+1, φα+1] // [xα, φα])α<γ . This can be computed using the construction of limits
with products and equalizers; in this case, one can verify that the limit of such a chain
reduces to compute the equalizer of the following diagram:
[x,
∧
α<γ φα]
[xx′,
∧
α<γ φα∧
∧
α<γ xα=x
′
α]
--
[xx′,
∧
α<γ φα∧
∧
α<γ ∃yα+1θ(yα+1,x
′
α)∧yα+1=xα+1]
11 [x
′,
∧
α<γ φα]
where x = x0, ...xα, .... From this construction and the construction of equalizers in
the syntactic category we can derive the sequent that expresses that the transfinite
composition of jointly covering families are jointly covering, and verify that the sequent
is provable within the theory making use of the transfinite transitivity rule.
Finally, if the theory is κ-Heyting, to construct universal quantification along a mor-
phism [xy, θ] : [x, φ] → [y, ψ], take a subobject [x, η] of its domain, in the canon-
ical form given in Lemma 2.3.1 3). Then define ∀[xy,θ]([x, η]) to be the subobject
[y, ψ ∧ ∀x(θ // η)] of [y, ψ]. It follows from Lemma 2.3.1 3) that this works.
This concludes the proof.
Due to the need of distinguishing several strengths of completeness, we introduce now
the following terminology:
Definition 2.3.4. A theory in a fragment of κ-first-order logic is said to be complete
with respect to models of a certain type if whenever a sequent is valid in those models,
it is provable from the axioms of the theory.
With this definition, we now get:
Theorem 2.3.5. If κ is any inaccessible cardinal, κ-coherent (resp. κ-Heyting) theo-
ries are semantically complete with respect to models in κ-coherent (resp. κ-Heyting)
categories.
2.4 Joyal’s theorem and Morleyization
The construction of the syntactic category is an aspect of the philosophy of theories as
categories, which is supplemented by the concept of internal theory of a given category
and the functorial semantics associated with it. For, say, a coherent category C there
is a canonical signature and coherent axioms associated to the category in such a way
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that coherent models of this theory correspond to coherent functors having the category
as a domain. That is, functors which preserve the categorical properties are seen as
models of the internal theory of the categories in the codomain categories. Moreover,
model homomorphisms correspond in this view to natural transformations of functors.
This allows us to think, for example, of the category M of set-valued coherent models
of a theory as corresponding functors from the syntactic category of the theory to
the category Set of sets. Consider now the further functor category SetM. To each
coherent formula in context we can assign its extension in each of the models of M,
or equivalently, evaluate the models, seen as functors, on the corresponding object
represented by the formula. This assignment is in fact functorial, and thus each coherent
formula in context gives rise to a functor in SetM, which we call the evaluation functor
at the corresponding formula. If we do this for every coherent formula in context, the
assignment of evaluation functors at formulas is itself functorial, and gives rise to a
functor ev : CT // Set
M.
In its original version, Joyal’s theorem is a statement over ZFC which could be de-
scribed as follows:
Theorem 2.4.1. (Joyal) Let T be a coherent theory and let M be the category of
coherent models of T. Then the functor
ev : CT // Set
M
is conservative and preserves any right adjoint to pullback functors that might exist in
CT.
For the proof of Joyal’s theorem we refer to [MR77], Ch. 6, pp. 189, since we will
later study and prove an infinitary version. The significance of the theorem resides in
that it encapsulates three different completeness theorems. The conservativity of ev is
a categorical way of saying that models in M are semantically complete for coherent
logic. In the particular case in which the logic is classical, this is precisely Go¨del’s
completeness theorem for first order logic. But even when we consider intuitionistic
logic, the preservation of the right adjoint entails that ev preserves the first-order
structure of CT, and through categorical semantics in the presheaf category Set
M we
can see that the conservative embedding provides a universal Kripke model of the
theory, resulting thus in Kripke completeness theorem for first-order intuitionistic logic.
We shall go some steps further and consider variations that provide new completeness
theorems in the infinitary case. More especifically, the work in Proposition 3.1.4 and
Theorem 3.2.1 will allow us to prove the following infinitary version of Joyal’s theorem:
Theorem 2.4.2. Let κ be a weakly (resp. strongly) compact cardinal; let T be a κ-
coherent theory of cardinality at most κ (resp. of arbitrary cardinality) and let M
be the category of κ-coherent models of T of cardinality at most κ (resp. of arbitrary
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cardinality). Then the functor
ev : CT // Set
M
is conservative and preserves any right adjoint to pullback functors that might exist in
CT.
We will see that the infinitary version of Joyal’s theorem subsumes the completeness
of κ-coherent logic with respect to Set-valued models (the conservativity of ev), that
of κ-first-order classical logic (the particular case when CT is Boolean), and the com-
pleteness of κ-first order intuitionistic logic with respect to infinitary Kripke semantics
(the universal Kripke model given by the embedding into the presheaf category).
We are also going to need one more fragment to work with:
Definition 2.4.3. The κ-regular fragment is the fragment of κ-coherent logic that drops
the disjunction ∨ from the language, and hence drops the rules involving it, but keeps
the rule of dependent choice.
The internal κ-coherent theory of a, say, κ-Heyting category can alternatively be de-
scribed by a different axiomatization, which will be simpler for our purposes. Following
[Joh02], where the process of rewriting of a classical first-order theory as an equiva-
lent coherent theory is referred to as “Morleyization”, we will also call “Morleyizing”
a theory, in general, rewriting it into a theory in a less expressive fragment. From a
categorical viewpoint (as opposed to the standard syntactic point of view), the syn-
tactic category CT of, for example, an intuitionistic κ-first-order theory T which is a
κ-Heyting category, is also a κ-coherent (resp. κ-regular) category, and thus CT has an
internal κ-coherent theory (resp. internal κ-regular theory), which we refer to as “the
theory of κ-coherent (resp. κ-regular) models of T”, (its “Morleyization” Tm). It is
not difficult to see (as it will become evident from the definition) that the theory and
its Morleyization have equivalent syntactic categories:
CT ≃ CTm
Although for classical κ-first-order theories, the κ-coherent Morleyization will have the
same models in all Boolean κ-coherent categories, in general when Morleyizing a κ-
first-order theory to a κ-coherent one (or a κ-coherent theory to a κ-regular one), this
is not the case, but there still some gain in considering the category of models of the
Morleyized theory, as our adaptation of Joyal’s theorem will show.
Definition 2.4.4. The theory of κ-regular ((i)–(iv) below) and the theory of κ-coherent
((i)–(v)) models Tm of a κ-first-order (resp. κ-coherent) theory T over a signature Σ
is defined as follows: its signature Σm extends Σ by adding for each κ-first-order (resp.
κ-coherent) formula φ over Σ with free variables x the relation symbol Pφ(x); then T
m
is the theory axiomatized by the following axioms:
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(i) Pφ ⊣⊢x φ for every atomic formula φ
(ii) Pφ ⊢x Pψ for every sequent φ ⊢x ψ provable in T;
(iii) P∧
i<γ φi
⊣⊢x
∧
i<γ Pφi ;
(iv) P∃yφ ⊣⊢x ∃yPφ;
(v) P∨
i<γ φi
⊣⊢x
∨
i<γ Pφi .
The theory of κ-coherent models of a positive κ-coherent3 theory is defined similarly;
alternatively (since we are only discarding ⊥) we could also treat ⊥ as a propositional
variable and add the axioms
⊥ ⊢x φ
for all formulas [x, φ] in context.
Definition 2.4.5. We will say that a positive κ-coherent model of a κ-coherent theory
is possibly exploding, and make the convention that such a model is exploding if it
assigns ⊥ the value true.
Note that since Pφ ⊢x Pψ in T
m if and only if φ ⊢x ψ in T, if positive κ-coherent
theories are complete for Set-valued models, then κ-coherent theories will be complete
for modified (i.e., possibly exploding) Set-valued models. Incidentally, any model of
T
m that assigns ⊥ the value true must be inhabited, since ⊥ ⊢ ∃x. (x = x) ∈ Tm.
2.5 Beth and Kripke models
The following is a direct generalization to the infinitary case of the Beth models (see
[Bet56]) used in intuitionistic logic, except that we allow the nodes of the underlying
tree to be possibly exploding (i.e., to force ⊥):
Definition 2.5.1. A Beth model for pure κ-first-order logic over Σ is a quadruple
B = (K,≤,D,), where (K,≤) is a tree of height κ and levels of size less than κ, and
with a set B of branches (i.e., maximal chains in the partial order) each of size κ; D
is a set-valued functor on K, and the forcing relation  is a binary relation between
elements of K and sentences of the language with constants from
⋃
k∈K D(k), defined
recursively for formulas φ as follows. There is an interpretation of function and relation
symbols in each D(k); if Rk ⊆ D(k)
λ is the interpretation in D(k) of the λ-ary relation
symbol R in the language, we have k ≤ l =⇒ Rk(Dkl(c)) ⊆ Rl(c) for c ⊆ Dk, and:
1. k  R(s(d)) ⇐⇒ ∃α < κ∀b ∈ Bk∃l ∈ b, level(l) = level(k) + α (Rl(s(Dkl(d))))
3The fragment which results after discarding ⊥.
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2. k 
∧
i<γ φi(d) ⇐⇒ k  φi(d) for every i < γ
3. k 
∨
i<γ φi(d) ⇐⇒ ∃α < κ∀b ∈ Bk∃l ∈ b, level(l) = level(k) + α (l 
φi(Dkl(d)) for some i < γ)
4. k  φ(d) // ψ(d′) ⇐⇒ ∀k′ ≥ k(k′  φ(Dkk′(d)) =⇒ k
′
 ψ(Dkk′(d
′))
5. k  ∃xφ(x,d) ⇐⇒ ∃α < κ∀b ∈ Bk∃l ∈ b, level(l) = level(k) + α ∃e ⊆
D(l)(l  φ(e,Dkl(d))
6. k  ∀xφ(x,d) ⇐⇒ ∀k′ ≥ k∀e ⊆ Dk′(k
′
 φ(e,Dkk′(d)))
A Beth model for a theory T is a Beth model for κ-first-order logic forcing all the
axioms of the theory and not forcing ⊥.
We have now:
Proposition 2.5.2. κ-first-order logic is sound for Beth models.
Proof. The key part of the proof is to note that the following property holds: for any
κ-first-order formula φ(x) and any node k in the Beth model, we have k  φ(c) ⇐⇒
∃α < κ∀b ∈ Bk∃l ∈ b, level(l) = level(k) + α (l  φ(Dkl(c))). This in turn can be
easily proved by induction on the complexity of φ making use of the regularity of κ.
Using now this property, it is easy to check the validity of all axioms and rules of κ-first-
order logic; the regularity of κ is used in the soundness of the transfinite transitivity
rule.
The restriction on the height and the size of the levels of the Beth model was motivated
by proving soundness for full κ-first-order logic. This restriction can be relaxed if we
do not intend to do so. We make thus the following:
Definition 2.5.3. Given a regular cardinal δ < κ and a set T consisting of logical and
non-logical axioms in a κ-first-order language, a partial Beth model of height δ for T
is defined like a Beth model for T, except that the branches have size δ, the ordinal α
in the clauses for atomic formulas, disjunction and existential quantification satisfies
α < δ, and the model only forces axioms in T.
A Kripke model is a special kind of Beth model none of whose nodes forces ⊥ and
where the forcing relation for atomic formulas, disjunction and existential quantification
satisfies the stronger condition level(l) = level(k):
Definition 2.5.4. A Kripke model for pure first-order logic over Σ is a quadruple
K = (K,≤,D,), where (K,≤) is a tree, D is a set-valued functor on K and the
forcing relation  is a binary relation between elements of K and sentences of the
language with constants from
⋃
k∈K D(k), satisfying k 1 ⊥ and defined recursively for
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formulas φ as follows. There is an interpretation of function and relation symbols in
each D(k); if Rk ⊆ D(k)
λ is the interpretation in D(k) of the λ-ary relation symbol R
in the language, we have k ≤ l =⇒ Rk(Dkl(c)) ⊆ Rl(c) for c ⊆ Dk, and:
1. k  R(s(d)) ⇐⇒ Rk(s(d))
2. k 
∧
i<γ φi(d) ⇐⇒ k  φi(d) for every i < γ
3. k 
∨
i<γ φi(d) ⇐⇒ k  φi(d) for some i < γ
4. k  φ(d) // ψ(d′) ⇐⇒ ∀k′ ≥ k(k′  φ(Dkk′(d)) =⇒ k
′
 ψ(Dkk′(d
′)))
5. k  ∃xφ(x,d) ⇐⇒ ∃e ⊆ D(k)(k  φ(e,d))
6. k  ∀xφ(x,d) ⇐⇒ ∀k′ ≥ k∀e ⊆ Dk′(k
′
 φ(e,Dkk′(d)))
A Kripke model for a theory T is a Kripke model forcing all the axioms of the theory.
A Kripke model can also be seen categorically as a model on a presheaf category. That
is, if CT is the syntactic category of the theory, a Kripke model on (K,≤) is nothing but
a κ-Heyting functor F : CT // Set
K , since such a functor determines the set-valued
functor D = F ([x,⊤]) : K //Set which specifies the underlying domains of the nodes.
In this case the forcing relation is given by k  φ(d) for d ∈ D(k)n if and only if
d : [−, k] // Dn = F ([x,⊤]) factors through the subobject F ([x, φ]) ֌ F ([x,⊤]),
where we use Yoneda lemma to identify elements of D(k) with natural transformations
[−, k] // D. This definition is precisely the forcing relation for the Kripke-Joyal se-
mantics in the topos SetK , whence the name Kripke associated to it. We therefore
have:
Proposition 2.5.5. κ-first-order logic is sound for Kripke models.
Proof. It is enough to note that presheaf categories are κ-Heyting and apply Theorem
2.3.5.
More generally, one can consider Kripke models on arbitrary categories M instead of
the tree K, and it turns out that the semantics of the Kripke model over M can be
recovered in terms of Kripke semantics over a certain collection of trees. To do that,
consider first the poset P which consists of finite composable sequences of morphisms
ofM, i.e., chains A0 // ... //An inM. One such sequence is below another in P if the
former is an initial segment of the latter. There is a functor E : P //M sending each
chain to the last object in it and sending any morphism f of P to the composite of the
morphisms ofM that are in the codomain minus the domain of f . Now, given a Kripke
model F : CT // Set
M, we can compose F with the transpose E∗ : SetM // SetP ,
and if this latter is a conservative κ-Heyting functor, this will provide a Kripke model
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on P forcing precisely the same formulas as the original model. Finally, the Kripke
model on P can be regarded as a collection of Kripke models on trees, where the roots
of the trees are given by one-element chains. This construction amounts to build the
Diaconescu cover of the topos SetM (see e.g. [MM94]). In our case the discussion
above shows that for our purposes it is enough to prove the following, which is the
infinitary counterpart of section 1.744 of [FS90]:
Lemma 2.5.6. The functor E∗ : SetM // SetP is conservative and κ-Heyting.
Proof. The conservativity of E∗ follows from the fact that E is surjective on objects and
arrows. To prove that it is κ-Heyting, the non-trivial part is proving that it preserves
∀. For a natural transformation f : F //G in SetM and a subfunctor A of F , we need
to show that E∗(∀fA) is the same subfunctor of E
∗(G) as ∀E∗(f)E
∗(A). By definition,
for any object p in P and y ∈ E∗(G)(p) = G(E(p)), we have y ∈ ∀E∗(f)E
∗(A)(p) if and
only if for all arrows l : p // q in P one has:
E∗(f)−1q (G(E(l))(y)) ⊆ E
∗(A)(q)
⇐⇒ ∀x(E∗(f)q(x) = G(E(l))(y) =⇒ x ∈ E
∗(A)(q))
⇐⇒ ∀x(fE(q)(x) = G(E(l))(y) =⇒ x ∈ A(E(q))) (1)
On the other hand, also by definition, for y ∈ G(E(p)) one has y ∈ ∀fA(E(p)) if and
only if for all arrows t : E(p) // r in M one has:
f−1r (G(t)(y)) ⊆ A(r)
⇐⇒ ∀x(fr(x) = G(t)(y) =⇒ x ∈ A(r)) (2)
But because the functor E is surjective (both on objects and arrows), we can find
q, l ∈ P such that r = E(q) and t = E(l), from which we deduce that (1) and (2) above
are equivalent. Hence, E∗∀ = ∀E∗, as we wanted.
2.6 Syntactic sites
The syntactic categories for fragments of κ-first-order logic can be equipped with ap-
propriate Grothendieck topologies in such a way that the corresponding sheaf toposes
are conservative models of the corresponding theories. Given a κ-regular category, we
can define the κ-regular coverage, where the covering families are all singletons f where
f is a cover. Similarly, for a κ-coherent category we can define the κ-coherent coverage,
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where the covering families are given by families of arrows fi : Ai // A of cardinality
less than κ such that the union of their images is the whole of A (in particular, the
initial object 0 is covered by the empty family). We can also find (see [BJ98]) a con-
servative sheaf model given by Yoneda embedding into the sheaf topos obtained with
the κ-coherent coverage. As proven in [BJ98], the embedding preserves κ-unions and
κ-intersections, as well as any Heyting structure that might exist in C. To highlight the
fact that images and unions are stable under pullback is crucial, we prove the following
lemma, which can be regarded as a generalization of the result corresponding to the
finitary case:
Lemma 2.6.1. Given a κ-coherent (resp. κ-Heyting) category C with the κ-coherent
coverage τ , Yoneda embedding y : C // Sh(C, τ) is a conservative κ-coherent (resp.
κ-Heyting) functor and Sh(C, τ) is a κ-Heyting category.
Proof. By [MR77], Proposition 3.3.3, we know that all representable functors are
sheaves for the κ-coherent coverage, since the fact that the union of the images of the
arrows in a covering family over A is the whole of A is equivalent to the fact that the
family is effective epimorphic, and this is precisely the sheaf condition on representable
functors.
In case C is κ-Heyting, the embedding preserves universal quantification as shown in
[BJ98], Lemma 3.1. For the sake of completeness we reproduce here the proof. Let
f : A // B be a morphism of C, A′ ֌ A a subobject of A, and write B′ ֌ B
for ∀f (A
′
֌ A). Let R′ ֌ y(B) be any subobject of y(B) in Sh(C, τ) such that
(y(f))∗(R) ≤ y(A′) in Sub(y(A)); we must show that R ≤ y(B′), i.e. that every
morphism in R factors through B′֌ B. Let g : C //B be such a morphism, and let
h : D //A be its pullback along f ; then h ∈ f∗(R), and so h factors through A′֌ A,
that is, the image A′′ ֌ A of h satisfies A′′ < A′. Since image factorizations in C are
stable under pullback, it follows that the image B′′֌ B of B satisfies B′′ ≤ B′; so we
have our required factorization.
Yoneda embedding preserves limits, and limits of sheaves are computed as in presheaves,
so it remains to prove that it preserves images and κ-unions. Given a cover f : A։ B,
we need to prove that [−, A] // [−, B] is a sheaf epimorphism, i.e., that it is locally sur-
jective. For this it is enough to find a covering family over each object C that witnesses
the local surjectivity. Given an element g in [C,B], we can simply form the pullback
of f along g, obtaining thus a covering family over consisting on the single arrow g∗(f)
which will clearly witness the local surjectivity.
The argument for the preservation of unions is similar: given the union
∨
i<γ Ai of
subobjects fi : Ai // B we need to show that [−,
∨
i<γ Ai] is the union of the sheaves
[−, Ai] . Given an object C and an element g in [C,
∨
i<γ Ai], the pullbacks along g
of f ′i : Ai
//
∨
i<γ Ai give a covering family {g
∗(f ′i) : Pi
// C}i<γ with the property
that g.g∗(f ′i) ∈ [Pi,
∨
i<γ Ai] belongs to [Pi, Ai], which is enough to guarantee that
[−,
∨
i<γ Ai] is indeed the union of the [−, Ai].
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Finally, we show that the sheaf topos is a κ-coherent category by proving that the
transfinite transitivity property holds in Sh(C, τ). To this end, suppose we have a family
of sheaves {Sf : β < γ, f ∈ γ
β} satisfying the premises of the transfinite transitivity
property, that is, that {Sg // Sf : g ∈ γ
β+1, g|β = f} form a jointly covering family
and that Sf |β = limα<β Sf |α for limit β. Then given c ∈ S∅(C) we define by transfinite
recursion a covering family {lf : Cf // C : β < γ, f ∈ γ
β} such that, given f ∈ γγ ,
c.lf ∈
∧
α<γ Sfi|α(C) for some fi ∈ γ
γ , witnessing that {
∧
α<γ Sf |α
// S∅ : f ∈ γ
γ} is
a jointly covering family. In fact, the covering family over C will be such that for any
fixed β < γ we will have that {lf : Cf //C : f ∈ γ
β} is a witness of the joint covering
of the sheaves {Sf : f ∈ γ
β}, that is, given f ∈ γβ we will have c.lf ∈ Sfi(C) for some
fi ∈ γ
β.
Supposing that {lf : Cf // C : β < µ, f ∈ γ
β} has been defined, we show how
to define the family at level µ. If µ is a successor ordinal µ = α + 1, we have by
inductive hypothesis a covering {lf : Cf // C : f ∈ γ
α} such that, given f ∈ γα,
c.lf ∈ Sfi(C) for some fi ∈ γ
α. Then, because {Sg // Sfi : g ∈ γ
µ, g|α = fi} is
jointly covering, we can find a covering {hgfi : Cg
// Cfi : g ∈ γ
µ, g|α = fi} such that,
given g ∈ γµ, g|α = fi, c.lg = (c.lfi).hgfi ∈ Sgj(C) for some gj ∈ γ
µ. This extends, by
transitivity, the definition of the covering family to level µ. If µ is a limit ordinal and
f ∈ γµ, we simply take Cf to be the limit of the diagram formed by Cf |α : α < µ. Then
clearly, given f ∈ γµ, c.lf ∈
∧
α<µ Sfk|α for some fk ∈ γ
µ. This finishes the recursive
construction of the family over C and proves the transfinite transitivity property for
the sheaves.
We get immediately:
Theorem 2.6.2. If κ is any inaccessible cardinal, κ-first-order theories are complete
with respect to models in κ-Heyting Grothendieck toposes.
3 Completeness
3.1 Completeness of infinitary coherent logic
We will need the following technical lemma, which corresponds to the canonical well-
ordering of κ× κ from [Jec03]:
Lemma 3.1.1. For every cardinal κ there is a well-ordering f : κ × κ // κ with the
property that f(β, γ) ≥ γ.
Proof. We define f by induction on max(β, γ) as follows:
f(β, γ) =
{
sup{f(β′, γ′) + 1 : β′, γ′ < γ}+ β if β < γ
sup{f(β′, γ′) + 1 : β′, γ′ < β}+ β + γ if γ ≤ β
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which satisfies the required property (see [Jec03], Theorem 3.5).
We have now:
Theorem 3.1.2. Let κ be an inaccessible cardinal. Then any κ-coherent theory of
cardinality less than κ has a partial Beth model of height less than κ.
Proof. Consider the syntactic category CT of the theory and its conservative embedding
in the topos of sheaves with the κ-coherent coverage, CT //Sh(CT, τ). By assumption,
the cardinality of the set S of all subformulas of axioms of the theory is δ < κ. Consider
for any object A the set of basic covering families over A (which are given by jointly
cover sets of arrows of cardinality less than κ) that witness than some subformula in S
is forced by A. That is, if S contains a subformula φ which is a (nonempty) disjunction∨
i<γ φi(β) (resp. an existential formula ∃α<γxαψ(x0, ...,xα, ...,β)), and A  φ(β), we
include in the set of coverings one of the form lj : Cj // A, where for each j we have
Cj  φij (βlj) for some ij < γ (resp. Cj  ψ(β
j
0, ...,β
j
α, ...βlj) for some β
j
0, ...,β
j
α, ...).
In case φ is ⊥, or φ is a conjunctive subformula, or A 1 φ(β) we just consider the
identity arrow as a cover.
The set of covering families over a given object A just specified has thus cardinality
δ. By adding identity covers to each set we can assume without loss of generality that
δ is regular and bigger than the maximum arity of function and relation symbols in S.
Construct a functor from a tree of height δ to the syntactic category, defined recursively
on the levels of the tree. Start with a well-ordering f : δ × δ // δ as in Lemma 3.1.1,
i.e., with the property that f(β, γ) ≥ γ. We describe by an inductive definition how
the tree obtained as the image of the functor is constructed.
The root of that tree is the terminal object. Suppose now that the tree is defined for
all levels λ < µ; we show how to define the nodes of level µ. Suppose first that µ is
a successor ordinal µ = α + 1, and let α = f(β, γ). Since by hypothesis f(β, γ) ≥ γ,
the nodes {pi}i<mγ at level γ are defined. Consider the morphisms g
α
ij over pi assigned
to the paths from each of the nodes pi to the nodes of level α. To define the nodes at
level α + 1, take then the β − th covering family over each pi and pull it back along
the morphisms gαij . This produces covering families over each node at level α, whose
domains are then the nodes of level α+1. Suppose now that µ is a limit ordinal. Then
each branch of the tree of height µ already defined determines a diagram, whose limit
is defined to be the node at level µ corresponding to that branch.
The tree has height δ, and clearly, the morphisms assigned to the paths from any node
p till the nodes of level α in the subtree over p form a basic covering family of p because
of the transfinite transitivity property. Define now a partial Beth model B over this
tree by defining as the underlying set of a node q the set of arrows from q to the object
[x,⊤] in the syntactic category, and where the function between the underlying set of
a node and its successor is given by composition with the corresponding arrow. There
is an interpretation of the function symbols in the subset underlying each node which
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corresponds to composition with the interpretation in the category of the corresponding
function symbol. For relations R (including equality), we set by definition Rq(s(α)) if
and only if q forces R(s(α)) in the sheaf semantics of the topos, that is, if q  R(s(α))
(we identify the category with its image through Yoneda embedding). We shall now
prove the following:
Claim : For every node p, every tuple α and every formula φ ∈ S, p  φ(α) if and
only if p B φ(α).
The proof goes by induction on φ.
1. If φ is atomic, the result is immediate by definition of the underlying structures
on each node.
2. If φ =
∧
i<γ ψi, the result follows easily from the inductive hypothesis, since we
have p 
∧
i<γ ψi(α) if and only if p  ψi(α) for each i < γ, if and only if
p B ψi(α) for each i < γ, if and only if p B
∧
i<γ ψi(α).
3. Suppose φ =
∨
i<γ ψi. If p 
∨
i<γ ψi, then there is a basic covering family
{fi : Ai // p}i<λ that appears at some point in the well-ordering, such that for
each i < λ, Ai  ψki(αfi) for some ki < γ. Now this covering family is pulled
back along all paths gj of a subtree to create the nodes of a certain level of the
subtree over p. Hence, every node mj in such a level satisfies mj  ψkj(αfg
′
j)
for some kj < γ. By inductive hypothesis, mj B ψkj(αfg
′
j), and hence we have
p B
∨
i<γ ψi.
Conversely, if p B
∨
i<γ ψi, there is a level in the subtree over p such that for
every node mj there one has mj B ψkj (αfj) for some kj < γ, so by inductive
hypothesis mj  ψkj(αfj). Since {fk : mk
// p} is, by construction, a basic
covering family, we must have p 
∨
i<γ ψi.
4. Suppose φ = ∃xψ(x,α). If p  ∃xψ(x,α), then there is a basic covering family
{fi : Ai // p}i<λ that appears at some point in the well-ordering, such that for
each i one has Ai  ψ(βi,αfi) for some βi : Ai // [x,⊤]. This basic cover
is hence pulled back along all paths gj of a subtree to create the nodes of a
certain level of the subtree over p. The nodes mij in this level will have the
property that mij  ψ(βig
′
j,αfig
′
j), and hence, by inductive hypothesis, that
mij B ψ(βig
′
j ,αfig
′
j). By definition, we get thus p B ∃xψ(x,α).
Conversely, suppose that p B ∃xψ(x,α). Then there is a level in the subtree
over p such that for every node mk there one has mk B ψ(βk,αfk) for some
βk : mk //[x,⊤], and hence, by inductive hypothesis, such thatmk  ψ(βk,αfk).
Since the arrows fk : mk //p form a basic cover of p, we must have p  ∃xψ(x,α).
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Proposition 3.1.3. If κ is an inaccessible cardinal, κ-coherent theories of cardinality
less than κ are complete with respect to Set-valued models.
Proof. It is enough to prove that every object in the sheaf model forcing the antecedent
φ(α) of a valid sequent φ ⊢x ψ also forces the consequent ψ(α) for every tuple α in
the domain. Construct a Beth model over a tree as above but taking as the root of
the tree a given object forcing φ(α) and including in the set of formulas S also the
subformulas of φ and ψ. For each branch b of the tree, consider the directed colimit
Db of all the underlying structures in the nodes of the branch, with the corresponding
functions between them. Such a directed colimit is a structure under the definitions:
1. for each function symbol f , we define f(x0, ..., xλ, ...) = f(x0, ..., xλ, ...) for some
representatives xi of xi; in particular, constants c are interpreted as c = c0, ..., cλ, ...;
2. for each relation symbol R we define R(x0, ..., xλ, ...) ⇐⇒ R(x0, ..., xλ, ...) for
some representatives xi of xi.
It is easy to check, using the regularity of δ, that the structure is well defined and
that the choice of representatives is irrelevant. We will show that such a structure is a
(possible exploding) positive κ-coherent model of the theory satisfying φ(α). Indeed,
we have the following:
Claim : Given any κ-coherent formula φ(x0, ..., xλ, ...) ∈ S, we haveDb  φ(α0, ..., αλ, ...)
if and only if for some node n in the path b, the underlying structure Cn satisfies
Cn  φ(α0, ..., αλ, ...) for some representatives αi of αi.
The proof of the claim is by induction on the complexity of φ.
1. If φ is R(t0, ..., tλ, ...) or s = t for given terms ti, s, t, the result follows by definition
of the structure.
2. If φ is of the form
∧
i<γ θi the result follows from the inductive hypothesis: θi is
forced at some node ni in the path b, and therefore
∧
i<γ θi will be forced in any
upper bound of {ni : i < γ} (here we use the regularity of δ).
3. If φ is of the form
∨
i<γ θi and Db  φ(α0, ..., αs, ...), then we can assume that
Db  θi(α0, ..., αs, ...) for some i < γ, so that by inductive hypothesis we get
Cn  φ(α1, ..., αs, ...) for some node n in b. Conversely, if Cn  φ(α0, ..., αs, ...)
for some node n in b, by definition of the forcing there is a node m above n in b
and a function fnm : Dn //Dm for which Cm  θi(fnm(α0), ..., fnm(αs), ...) for
some i < γ, so that by inductive hypothesis we get Db  φ(α0, ..., αs, ...).
4. Finally, if φ is of the form ∃xψ(x, x0, ..., xs, ...) and Db  φ(α0, ..., αs, ...), then
Db  ψ(α, α0, ..., αs, ...) for some α, and then Cn  ψ(α, α0, ..., αs, ...) for some
node n by inductive hypothesis. Conversely, if Cn  φ(α0, ..., αs, ...) for some
node n in b, then by definition of the forcing there is a node m above n in b and
a function fnm : Dn //Dm for which Cm  ψ(fnm(α), fnm(α0), ..., fnm(αs), ...),
which implies that Db  ψ(α, α0, ..., αs, ...) and hence Db  φ(α0, ..., αs, ...).
Since ψ(α) is satisfied in all κ-coherent models of the theory satisfying φ(α), it is
satisfied in all models of the form Db (even if the structure Db is exploding). Hence,
ψ(α) is forced at a certain node of every branch of the tree. By taking limits over the
diagram formed by each branch b we get nodes at level δ which also have to force ψ(α).
Because these nodes form a basic covering family, ψ(α) is therefore forced at the root,
as we wanted to prove.
One can remove the restriction on the cardinality of the theory if one assumes instead
that κ is a weakly (resp. strongly) compact cardinal:
Proposition 3.1.4. If κ is a weakly (resp. strongly) compact cardinal, κ-coherent
theories of cardinality at most κ (resp. of arbitrary cardinality) are complete with
respect to Set-valued models.
Proof. Suppose that the sequent φ ⊢x ψ is valid in every model of a certain theory
but not provable. Then it is not provable in any subtheory of cardinality less than
κ. Therefore, if we add to the language new constants c and axioms ⊤ ⊢ φ(c) and
ψ(c) ⊢ ⊥, any subtheory of cardinality less than κ together with these two new axioms
has, by Proposition 3.1.3, a model. Since κ is weakly (resp. strongly) compact, the
whole theory has a model, which provides a model for the original theory where φ ⊢x ψ
is not valid.
Remark 3.1.5. In the particular case when κ = ω, Proposition 3.1.4 reduces to the
completeness theorem for coherent logic. The proof given is thus an alternative path to
the usual categorical treatment of Henkinization that we see in [Joh02], D 1.5, and is
closer to the methods in [CLR01].
Incidentally, a slight modification on the definition of witnessing covers that build
the underlying tree of the partial Beth model in Theorem 3.1.2 yields a full model for
κ-first-order theories:
Theorem 3.1.6. Let κ be an inaccessible cardinal. Then any κ-first-order theory of
cardinality at most κ has a universal4 Beth model.
4By universal we mean a conservative model, that is, one in which true sequents are provable.
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Proof. We consider, for any object, a well-ordering of the set of basic covering families
over the object, which are given by jointly covering sets of arrows (of cardinality less
than κ), that is, we include in the set S all possible covering families and not just the
ones that witness some disjunction or existential formula. Since κ is inaccessible, it is
easy to see that this set has cardinality κ. We define a tree of height κ as before, using
a well-ordering f : κ×κ //κ as in Lemma 3.1.1. There is an obvious interpretation of
the function symbols in the subset underlying each node, as before. If for relations R
(including equality), we set by definition Rq(s(α)) if and only if q forces R(s(α)) in the
sheaf semantics of the topos (we identify the category with its image through Yoneda
embedding), we will have, as before, the:
Claim : For every node p, every tuple α and every formula φ ∈ S, p  φ(α) if and
only if p B φ(α).
The proof is again by induction on φ, and the steps for the atomic formulas, conjunc-
tions, disjunctions and existential quantification are the same as before. We need only
to consider implication and universal quantification.
1. Suppose φ = ψ // θ. If p  ψ(α) // θ(α), for every f : c // p in the category
one has c  ψ(αf) =⇒ c  θ(αf). In particular, this holds when c is any node q
in the tree above p, and by inductive hypothesis one has q B ψ(αf) =⇒ q B
θ(αf) for all such nodes. Therefore, p B ψ(α) // θ(α).
Conversely, suppose that p B ψ(α) // θ(α) and consider an arrow f : c // p.
Together with the identity, this arrow forms a covering family which appears at
some point in the well-ordering and is hence pulled back along paths gj of a
subtree to build the next level of the subtree over p. Suppose that c  ψ(α); then
g∗j (c)  ψ(αg
′
j), so by inductive hypothesis one has g
∗
j (c) B ψ(αg
′
j). Therefore,
we get g∗j (c) B θ(αg
′
j), and using once more the inductive hypothesis, g
∗
j (c) 
θ(αg′j). But g
′
j = f
∗(gj) : g
∗
j (c)
// c is a basic cover of c (since the gj form a
basic cover of p), and hence we will have c  θ(α). We have, thus, proved that
p  ψ(α) // θ(α)
2. Suppose φ = ∀xψ(x,α). If p  ∀xψ(x,α), for every f : c // p in the category
and every β : c // [x,⊤] one has c  ψ(β,α). In particular, this holds when c is
any node q in the tree above p, and by inductive hypothesis one has q B ψ(β,α)
for all such nodes. Therefore, p B ∀xψ(x,α).
Conversely, suppose that p B ∀xψ(x,α) and consider an arrow f : c // p.
Together with the identity, this arrow forms a covering family which appears at
some point in the well-ordering and is hence pulled back along the paths gj of
a subtree to build the next level of the subtree over p. Suppose we have some
β : c // [x,⊤]; then we have arrows βf∗(gj) : g
∗
j (c)
// [x,⊤], and by definition
we must have g∗j (c) B ψ(βf
∗(gj),αfg
′
j), so by inductive hypothesis one has
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g∗j (c)  ψ(βf
∗(gj),αfg
′
j). But f
∗(gj) : g
∗
j (c)
// c is a basic cover of c (since the
gj form a basic cover of p), and hence we will have c  ψ(β,α). We have thus
proved that p  ∀xψ(x,α).
This finishes the proof.
We conclude with an equivalent characterization of weak (resp. strong) compactness.
Definition 3.1.7. A κ-complete lattice will be called κ-distributive if it satisfies the
intuitionistic distributivity law, i.e., if a∧
∨
i<γ bi ⊢
∨
i<γ a ∧ bi for every γ < κ, and if
the following propositional version of transfinite transitivity property holds: for every
γ < κ and all elements {af : f ∈ γ
β, β < γ} such that
af ≤
∨
g∈γβ+1,g|β=f
ag
for all f ∈ γβ, β < γ, and
af =
∧
α<β
af |α
for all limit β, f ∈ γβ , β < γ, we have that
a∅ ≤
∨
f∈γγ
∧
β<γ
af |β .
A κ-complete filter in the lattice is a filter F such that whenever ai ∈ F for every
i ∈ I, |I| < κ, then
∧
i∈I ai ∈ F . Dually, a κ-complete ideal in the lattice is an ideal I
such that whenever ai ∈ I for every i ∈ I, |I| < κ, then
∨
i∈I ai ∈ I. A κ-prime filter
in the lattice is a filter F such that whenever
∨
i∈I ai is in F for |I| < κ then ai ∈ F
for some i ∈ I.
Lemma 3.1.8. Given any proper κ-complete filter F in a κ-complete, κ-distributive
lattice L, there exists a surjective morphism θ : L //K into a κ-complete, κ-distributive
lattice K such that θ−1(1) = F .
Proof. The proof is an adaptation of that exposed e.g. in [MM94], V.9, for Heyting
algebras. Consider first the case in which the filter F is principal, given by some
element u as the set {u′ : u′ ≥ u}. Define now an equivalence relation on L by setting
a ∼= b ⇐⇒ a ∧ u = b ∧ u. Denoting by au the equivalence class of a, we can give
the quotient L/u a structure of a κ-complete lattice with the partial order given by
au ≤ bu ⇐⇒ a ∧ u ≤ b ∧ u. On the resulting poset of equivalence classes, the meet
and the join are given as follows:
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∧
i∈γ
aiu =

∧
i∈γ
ai


u
∨
i∈γ
aiu =

∨
i∈γ
ai


u
That these operations are well defined follows from the fact that L is κ-distributive.
With these operations, it also follows that L/u inherits the κ-distributivity.
Now, if we had u ≤ v ≤ w in L, there are evident morphisms L/w //L/v //L/u with
composite L/w // L/u. Then for a general filter F , we just define K as the colimit:
lim
u∈F
L/u.
Since F is κ-complete, it follows that the colimit is κ-filtered, and hence it inherits
all the structure of κ-complete, κ-distributive lattice of each L/u. This finishes the
proof.
We can state now:
Proposition 3.1.9. A cardinal κ is weakly (resp. strongly) compact if and only if, given
any proper κ-complete ideal I in a κ-complete, κ-distributive lattice L of cardinality at
most κ (resp. of arbitrary cardinality), and given a κ-complete filter F disjoint from
I, there exists a κ-complete, κ-prime filter containing F and disjoint from I.
Proof. The “if” part follows by restricting ourselves to the case when the lattice is
a Boolean algebra; we prove here the “only if” part. Consider the quotient L′ of the
lattice L by F given by Lemma 3.1.8; this is a κ-complete and κ-distributive lattice, and
the image of I is a proper κ-complete ideal I ′. Define a new propositional variable Pa
for each element a of L′ and consider the theory axiomatized by the following axioms:
1. Pa ⊢ ⊥ for all a ∈ I
′
2.
∧
i∈I Pai ⊢ P(
∧
i∈I ai)
for all ai and |I| < κ
3. P(
∨
i∈I ai)
⊢
∨
i∈I Pai for all ai and |I| < κ
This is a theory over the κ-coherent fragment which has cardinality at most κ. Each
subtheory of cardinality less than κ involves γ < κ propositional variables, whose cor-
respondent elements generate a (non trivial) κ-complete sublattice of L′ of cardinality
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2γ < κ (as every element there is equivalent to one of the form
∨
i<γ
∧
j<γ Paij ) con-
taining, thus, less than κ many κ-prime filters. By Proposition 3.1.3, the intersection of
all κ-prime filters of any such sublattice is {1}, and hence any such sublattice contains
at least one κ-prime filter disjoint from elements of I ′. This shows that each subtheory
of cardinality less than κ has a model. Since κ is weakly (resp. strongly) compact,
the whole theory has a model, which corresponds to a κ-complete, κ-prime filter of
L′ whose preimage along the quotient map provides a κ-complete, κ-prime filter in L
containing F and disjoint from I.
Remark 3.1.10. Proposition 3.1.9 can be used to provide a representation theorem for
κ-complete, κ-distributive lattices of cardinality at most κ (resp. of arbitrary cardinal-
ity) in terms of lattices of subsets. More especifically, the κ-complete lattice morphism
f that maps an element e ∈ L to the set of κ-complete, κ-prime filters containing e pro-
vides an isomorphism of lattices L // f(L) precisely when κ is weakly (resp. strongly)
compact.
3.2 Completeness of infinitary intuitionistic first-order logic
Having now at hand a completeness theorem for κ-coherent theories, we can adapt
the proof of Joyal’s theorem by replacing the category of coherent models with that of
κ-coherent models. As a result, we get:
Theorem 3.2.1. If κ is weakly (resp. strongly) compact, κ-first-order theories of car-
dinality at most κ (resp. of arbitrary cardinality) are complete with respect to Kripke
models.
Proof. Consider the syntactic category C of the κ-coherent Morleyization Tm of the
theory T. Let Coh(C) be the category of κ-coherent models of Tm of size at most κ
(resp. of arbitrary size), and where arrows are model homomorphisms. We have a
functor ev : C // SetCoh(C) sending an object A to the evaluation functor ev(A). It is
clear that this functor is κ-coherent, and by Proposition 3.1.4, it is also conservative
(this is because any model contains an elementary submodel of cardinality at most κ,
by the usual Lo¨wenheim-Skolem construction). We must prove that ev also preserves
∀.
Given an arrow f : A //B, a subobject C ֌ A and the subobject Y = ∀f (C)֌ B,
we need to show that ev(Y ) = ∀ev(f)(ev(C)) as subobject of ev(B). By the definition of
∀ in the Heyting category SetCoh(C), this reduces to proving the following equivalence,
for every y ∈ ev(B)(M) =M(B):
y ∈ ev(Y )(M) ⇐⇒ For every model N, for every model homomorphism
φ :M //N,
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(ev(f)N )
−1(φB(y)) ⊆ ev(C)(N)
that is:
y ∈M(Y ) ⇐⇒ For every model N, for every model homomorphism
φ :M //N,
(N(f))−1(φB(y)) ⊆ N(C)
The implication =⇒ can be proven as follows: if y ∈ M(Y ), then φB(y) ∈ N(Y ),
and so, since N is κ-coherent, φB(y) = N(f)(x) gives x ∈ N(f)
−1(N(∀f (C))) =
N(f−1∀f (C)) ⊆ N(C).
Let us focus on the other implication. Consider the following diagram in C:
C = [x, θ]


∀f (C) = [y, γ]


A = [x, φ]
f=[xy,λ]
// B = [y, ψ]
Applying the functor ev and evaluating at a model M gives the diagram:
{d|M  θ(d)}


{c|M  γ(c)}


{d|M  φ(d)}
{d,c|Mλ(d,c)}
// {c|M  ψ(c)}
Given c ∈ ∀ev(f)(ev(C)), we need to prove that M  γ(c). Consider the positive dia-
gram of M , Diag+(M), which, in a language extended with constants c for every ele-
ment c of the underlying set ofM , consists of all sequents of the form⊤ ⊢ ψ(c0, ..., cα, ...)
for every positive atomic ψ such that M  ψ(c0, ..., cα, ...) (we identify the constants
symbols with the elements ofM , to simplify the exposition). If N ′ is a model of Th(M)
of size at most κ (resp. of arbitrary size), then, defining N as the reduct of N ′ with
respect to the elements {cN
′
: c ∈M} we can define φ :M //N by φ(c) = cN
′
, which
is a well defined model homomorphism. But we know that for all φ : M // N one
has N(f)−1(φB(c)) ⊆ N(C). This implies that for all models N
′ of Th(M) of size at
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most κ (resp. of arbitrary size), the sequent λ(x, c/y) ⊢x θ(x) holds, and therefore,
the sequent ψ(c) ∧ λ(x, c/y) ⊢x θ(x) also holds.
By Proposition 3.1.4, this means that such a sequent is provable in Th(M). Be-
sides sequents in Tm, this proof uses less than κ sequents of the general form ⊤ ⊢
φi(c, c0, ..., cα, ...), where the φi are positive atomic sentences corresponding to the di-
agram of M and the ci are elements of M . Considering the conjunction ξ of the φi, we
see that there is a proof in Tm from:
⊤ ⊢ ξ(c, c0, ..., cα, ...)
to
ψ(c) ∧ λ(x, c/y) ⊢x θ(x)
By the deduction theorem (Lemma 1.2.3), since ξ(c, c0, ..., cα, ...) is a sentence, we
obtain in Tm a derivation of:
ξ(c, c0, ..., cα, ...) ∧ ψ(c) ∧ λ(x, c/y) ⊢x θ(x)
But it is always possible to replace the constants by variables as long as they are added
to the contexts of the sequents, so using the existential rule, we have also a derivation
of:
∃x0...xα...ξ(y,x0, ...,xα, ...) ∧ ψ(y) ∧ λ(x,y) ⊢xy θ(x)
Calling Y ′ = [y,Φ(y)] the subobject of B given by the interpretation in C of the
formula:
∃x0...xα...ξ(y,x0, ...,xα, ...) ∧ ψ(y)
we have a proof of the sequent:
Φ(y) ∧ λ(x,y) ⊢xy θ(x)
and hence also of the sequent:
∃y(Φ(y) ∧ λ(x,y)) ⊢x θ(x)
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Now the antecedent is precisely the pullback of the subobject Φ(y) of B along f , so
by adjunction we have Y ′ ≤ ∀f (C) = [y, γ], i.e., the sequent Φ(y) ⊢y γ(y) is provable.
Therefore, since M  Φ(c), it follows that M  γ(c), as we wanted to prove.
There is also the following converse of Theorem 3.2.1:
Proposition 3.2.2. The completeness theorem of κ-first order/κ-coherent theories of
cardinality κ (resp. of arbitrary cardinality) with respect to Kripke models/Tarski mod-
els implies that κ is weakly (resp. strongly) compact.
Proof. We prove first that completeness of κ-coherent theories of cardinality κ is en-
tailed by Kripke completeness of κ-first-order theories of cardinality κ. Given a κ-
coherent theory, suppose a coherent sequent is valid in all κ-coherent models in Set.
Then it is necessarily forced at every node of every Kripke model, and therefore prov-
able from the axioms of the theory in κ-first-order logic. Because κ-first-order logic is
conservative over κ-coherent logic (as there is, by Lemma 2.6.1, a conservative embed-
ding of the syntactic category of the latter into a sheaf topos verifying the former), it
has to be provable already in κ-coherent logic.
To prove that the completeness of κ-coherent theories of cardinality κ implies weak
compactness, given a tree of height κ and levels of size less than κ, consider the theory
of a cofinal branch, over a language containing a unary relation symbol P and one
constant a for every node in the tree and axiomatized as follows:
⊤ ⊢
∨
a∈Lα
P (a)
for each α < κ, where Lα is the level of height α;
P (a) ∧ P (b) ⊢ ⊥
for each pair a 6= b ∈ Lα and each α < κ;
P (a) ⊢ P (b)
for each pair a, b such that a is a successor of b.
Then the theory is certainly consistent within Lκ,κ, as every subtheory of cardinality
less than κ has a Tarski model, so by completeness it follows that the whole theory has
a Tarski model, corresponding to a cofinal branch.
Finally, in case we have Kripke completeness of κ-first-order theories of arbitrary
cardinality, we can deduce in a similar way as before the completeness of κ-coherent
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theories of arbitrary cardinalities. To show that this latter implies strong compactness,
consider a κ-complete filter F in the lattice L of subsets of a set. In a language
containing a constant a for every a ∈ L/F and a unary relation symbol P , consider the
following theory of a κ-complete ultrafilter:
1. P (a) ⊢ P (b) for every pair a ≤ b in L
2.
∧
i<γ P (ai) ⊢ P (
∧
i<γ ai) for all families {ai}i<γ such that γ < κ
3. ⊤ ⊢ P (a) ∨ P (¬a) for every a ∈ L
Since the theory is consistent (as it has a model in L/F itself), by κ-coherent com-
pleteness it has a Tarski model, which provides a κ-complete ultrafilter in L/F whose
preimage along the quotient map yields a κ-complete ultrafilter in L extending F .
Therefore, κ is strongly compact.
3.3 Heyting cardinals
It is known, as we will prove in the next section, that for inaccessible κ, κ-first-order
classical logic is complete for theories of cardinality less than κ. This was first observed
by Karp in [Kar64], and one naturally wonders if the analogous situation holds in the
intuitionistic case. This motivates the following:
Definition 3.3.1. We say that κ is a Heyting cardinal if κ is inaccessible and κ-first-
order logic is complete for theories of cardinality less than κ.
By Theorem 3.2.1 we know that, in terms of strength, a Heyting cardinal lies be-
tween inaccessible and weakly compact cardinals. Its exact large cardinal strength
and relationship with other classical large cardinal properties is however currently un-
known, although we will outline some evidence that relates it to an instance of weak
compactness.
As applications of completeness, we obtain the disjunction and existence properties:
Proposition 3.3.2. If κ is a Heyting cardinal, κ-first-order intuitionistic logic Lκ,κ
has the infinitary disjunction property. That is, if ⊤ ⊢
∨
i∈I φi is provable in the empty
theory, then, for some i ∈ I, ⊤ ⊢ φi is already provable.
Proof. This is a straightforward generalization of the usual semantic proof in the fini-
tary case, based on the completeness with respect to Kripke models over trees. If no
sequent ⊤ ⊢ φi was provable, there would be a countermodel for each. Then we can
build a new Kripke tree appending to these countermodels a bottom node whose un-
derlying set consists just of the constants of the language, with the obvious injections
into the roots of the countermodels (and forcing no atoms). Such a Kripke tree would
then be a countermodel for ⊤ ⊢
∨
i∈I φi.
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Proposition 3.3.3. If κ is a Heyting cardinal, κ-first-order intuitionistic logic Lκ,κ
over a language without function symbols and with at least one constant symbol has the
infinitary existence property. That is, if ⊤ ⊢ ∃xφ(x) is provable in the empty theory,
then, for some constants c, ⊤ ⊢ φ(c) is already provable.
Proof. The proof of this is similar to the one given for the disjunction property. If no
sequent ⊤ ⊢ φ(c) was provable, there would be a countermodel for each choice of c.
Then we can build a new Kripke tree appending to these countermodels a bottom node
forcing no atoms, whose underlying domain contains just the constants of the language,
again with the obvious injections into the roots of the countermodels (and forcing no
atoms). Such a Kripke tree would then be a countermodel for ⊤ ⊢ ∃xφ(x).
It is possible that the disjunction and existence properties themselves represent a
large cardinal notion different from mere inaccessibility. To see this, note first that the
methods of [dJ80] allow to prove that κ-propositional logic (including the distributivity
rule) with at least two atoms has κ many mutually non-equivalent formulas5, and
so the same holds in general for κ-first-order logic. This implies that the κ-coherent
Morleyization of κ-first-order logic contains κmany relation symbols which are mutually
non-equivalent, and so it has has signature of cardinality κ (as well as κ-many axioms).
By Proposition 3.1.3, this theory is κ-satisfiable, i.e., any subset of less than κ axioms
has a model. But the following proposition will show that the whole theory has a
model, without using an instance of weak compactness:
Proposition 3.3.4. If κ-first-order logic has the disjunction and the existence proper-
ties, its κ-coherent Morleyization has a Set-valued model.
Proof. Consider the syntactic category C of the theory T. We will show that the
representable functor y(1) = [1,−] : C // Set is a κ-coherent functor, providing thus
the model of the Morleyized theory Tm. Since y(1) preserves all limits, it will preserve
in particular κ-limits, so it is enough to show that it preserves κ-unions and covers.
That
∨
i<γ y(1)(Ai) ≤ y(1)(
∨
i<γ Ai) follows since y(1) preserves limits and hence
monomorphisms. To see the other inequality, let f : 1 //
∨
i<γ Ai. Then we have
1 =
∨
i<γ f
−1(Ai). By the disjunction property, 1 = f
−1(Aj) for some j < γ, and hence
f factors through Aj ֌
∨
i<γ Ai. This shows that y(1)(
∨
i<γ Ai) ≤
∨
i<γ y(1)(Ai), as
we wanted.
Finally, suppose we have a cover g : A։ B; we must show that any h : 1 //B factors
through A. For this, in turn, it is enough to take the pullback h−1(g) : h−1(A) ։ 1
and find a section s for h−1(g), then we can take the required factorization as the
5This is a remarkable property of infinitary intuitionistic logic. In classical infinitary propositional
logic Lκ, for example, the distributivity property implies, by a theorem of Tarski (see [Tar30]), that
when there are less than κ-many atoms, the logic has less than κ many mutually non-equivalent
formulas.
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composite g−1(h)◦s : 1 //A. Let h−1(A) = [x, φ(x)]. Since h−1(g) is a cover, we have
⊤ ⊢ ∃xφ(x). By the existence property, there are some c with [[c]] : 1 // [x,⊤] such
that ⊤ ⊢ φ(c). But φ(c) is the pullback of [x, φ(x)]֌ [x,⊤] along [[c]], which provides
the required section since 1 = φ(c). This finishes the proof.
To summarize, if the disjunction and existence properties hold for κ (for example if κ
is a Heyting cardinal), there is a κ-satisfiable Lκ,κ-theory over a signature of cardinality
κ, and with κ-many axioms, which has a model. Since there are κ many mutually non-
equivalent relation symbols, it follows that models for subtheories of less than κ many
axioms do not trivially extend to models of the whole theory. The existence of a model
for the whole theory could thus require an instance of weak compactness in an essential
way.
3.4 Karp’s theorem and completeness of classical infinitary systems
In the classical case, when the syntactic category is Boolean, we can prove that Proposi-
tion 3.1.3 reduces to the completeness theorem of Karp in [Kar64], since we know that
the transfinite transitivity property can be rewritten into the classical distributivity
and dependent choice axiom schemata. This reduction will be possible due to classical
Morleyization, which is the infinitary version of the process explained in [Joh02], D 1.5:
Theorem 3.4.1. (Karp) If κ is inaccessible, theories of cardinality less than κ within
the classical first-order system of Karp are complete with respect to Set-valued models.
Proof. Suppose the sequent φ ⊢x ψ is valid in all models in Set. Let S be the set of
subformulas of some axiom of T or of φ or ψ. We consider now the classical Morleyized
theory Tm, over a signature Σm that extends the original signature Σ by adding for
each κ-first-order formula φ ∈ S over Σ with free variables x two new relation symbols
Cφ(x) and Dφ(x), and whose axioms are:
(i) Cφ(x) ∧Dφ(x) ⊢x ⊥;
(ii) ⊤ ⊢x Cφ(x) ∨Dφ(x);
(iii) Cφ ⊣⊢x φ for every atomic formula φ;
(iv) Cφ ⊢x Cψ for every axiom φ ⊢x ψ of T;
(v) C∧
i<γ φi
⊣⊢x
∧
i<γ Cφi ;
(vi) C∨
i<γ φi
⊣⊢x
∨
i<γ Cφi ;
(vii) Cφ→ψ ⊣⊢x Dφ ∨ Cψ
(viii) C∃yφ ⊣⊢x ∃yCφ;
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(ix) D∀yφ ⊣⊢x ∃yDφ.
These axioms are all κ-coherent and they ensure that the interpretations of [x, Cφ(x)]
and [x,Dφ(x)] in any Boolean category (including Set) will coincide with those of
[x, φ(x)] and [x,¬φ(x)], respectively, and that, moreover, Tm-models coincide with
T-models in such categories. Also, since S has cardinality less than κ, so does Tm.
Now, if a sequent φ ⊢x ψ is valid in all T-models in Set, then Cφ ⊢x Cψ will be valid
in every Tm-model in Set, and therefore will be provable in Tm by Proposition 3.1.3.
Replace in this proof every subformula of the form Cφ(t1, ..., tα, ...) by the corresponding
substitution instance of φ(t/x), and every subformula of the form Dφ(t1, ..., tα, ...) by
the corresponding substitution instance of ¬φ(t/x). We claim that this way we will get
a proof in T of the sequent φ ⊢x ψ using the rules of κ-first-order systems. Indeed, the
effect of the transformation just described on the axioms of Tm produces either axioms
of T or sequents classically provable from T; finally, any instance of the transfinite
transitivity rule used is, by Theorem 1.2.7, classically provable from the instances of
classical distributivity and classical dependent choice.
If one sticks to the transfinite transitivity rule, it is possible to sharpen these methods
to prove completeness of a variety of classical systems. We will consider a variant of
the instances of transfinite transitivity rule in which the conclusion is slightly modified.
We call TTBγ the rule:
φf ⊢yf
∨
g∈γβ+1,g|β=f
∃xgφg β < γ, f ∈ γ
β
φf ⊣⊢yf
∧
α<β
φf |α β < γ, limit β, f ∈ γ
β
φ∅ ⊢y∅
∨
f∈B
∃β<δfxf |β+1
∧
β<δf
φf |β
subject to the same provisos as the original rule, but where now B ⊆ γγ consists of
the minimal elements of a given bar over the tree γγ , and the δf are the levels of the
corresponding f ∈ B. The proof of soundness of this rule in Set is an easy modification
of that of the original rule. If TTγ = ∪BTT
B
γ and we denote by Lγ+,γ(TTγ) Karp’s
classical system in which distributivity and dependent choice are replaced by the rules
TTγ , we have now:
Theorem 3.4.2. If γ is regular and γα = γ for every α < γ, theories of cardinality at
most γ in the classical system Lγ+,γ(TTγ) are complete for Set-valued models.
Proof. The proof follows the same lines as the proof for 3.4.1, except that instead of
relying on Proposition 3.1.3, we prove an analogous completeness theorem for theories
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with at most γ axioms in the (γ+, γ, γ)-coherent fragment of Lγ+,γ,γ . The system
for this fragment is like that of the infinitary coherent fragment, with two differences:
first, only disjunctions can be indexed by sets of cardinality γ, while the indexing sets of
conjunctions and existential quantification is always less than γ (this means that in the
inductive definition of formulas of the type
∧
i<α φi and
∨
i<α φi we need to make sure
that |∪i<αFV (φi)| < γ, and in particular, the contexts of the formulas in the syntactic
category have length always less than γ); second, the transfinite transitivity rule is
replaced by the rule TTγ , which is expressible in the fragment due to the hypothesis on
γ. There is an obvious embedding from the syntactic category of this fragment into a
sheaf topos, and one can show much as in the proof of Lemma 2.6.1 that the embedding
preserves the relevant structure.
We prove this completeness theorem much as in the proof of Proposition 3.1.3, but now
the building covering families over each object A, used to construct the tree, witness if A
forces each of the γ-many subformulas of the axioms or of the valid sequent φ ⊢x ψ (we
call this set of subformulas S); that is, if the subformula η is a (nonempty) disjunction∨
i<γ φi(β) (resp. an existential formula ∃α<γxαψ(x0, ...,xα, ...,β)), and A  η(β), we
include in the set of coverings one of the form lj : Cj // A, where for each j we have
Cj  φij (βlj) for some ij < γ (resp. Cj  ψ(β
j
0, ...,β
j
α, ...βlj) for some β
j
0, ...,β
j
α, ...).
In case η is ⊥, or η is a conjunctive subformula, or A 1 η(β) we just consider the
identity arrow as a cover. Thus although the tree has branching type γ+, its height is
γ.
It is enough to prove that every object in the sheaf model forcing the antecedent φ(α)
of the valid sequent φ ⊢x ψ also forces the consequent ψ(α) for every tuple α in the
domain. We can thus consider a partial Beth model over the tree of height γ so defined
taking as the root of the tree an object forcing φ(α), and the directed colimit Db of
all the underlying structures in the nodes of a cofinal branch b of the tree. We then
make it into a structure with the expected definition and prove that it is a model of the
theory. For this, we prove that given any κ-coherent formula φ(x0, ..., xλ, ...) ∈ S, we
have Db  φ(α0, ..., αλ, ...) if and only if for some node n in b, the underlying structure
Cn satisfies Cn  φ(α0, ..., αλ, ...) for some representatives αi of αi (the regularity of γ is
used in the definition of the structure in Db and in the inductive step for conjunctions).
Now, since any (γ+, γ, γ)-coherent formula satisfied in the models given by the directed
colimits of the underlying structures of the nodes along all cofinal branches, is forced
at some node of every branch, an application of the categorical property corresponding
to the rule TTγ proves that ψ(α) is forced at the roots, and the completeness of the
(γ+, γ, γ)-coherent fragment follows.
Finally, for the classical Morleyization, we add to the axioms of Tm also the axioms:
D∧
i<γ+
φi ⊣⊢x
∨
i<γ+
Dφi ,
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which, taking advantage of the classical relation between conjunctions and disjunctions,
are able to code conjunctions with indexing set of size γ into the (γ+, γ, γ)-coherent
fragment considered. Then we proceed as in Theorem 3.4.1 to finish the proof.
Remark 3.4.3. Theorem 3.4.2 applies, for example, when γ is inaccessible, or for
any regular γ as long as we assume the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis. It is also
best possible in terms of the cardinality of theories for which one is able to derive
completeness, since it is known from Jensen (see [Jen72]) that V = L implies the
existence of γ+-Aronszajn trees, for which the theory of a cofinal branch ( cf. proof of
Proposition 3.2.2) is consistent but has no model.
Corollary 3.4.4. (Karp) Countable theories in the classical system Lω1,ω are complete
with respect to Set-valued models.
Proof. It is enough to apply Theorem 3.4.2 and notice that TTω is actually provable in
Lω1,ω. To see this, we construct the proof tree as follows. Let
C =
∨
f∈B
∃β<δfxf |β+1
∧
β<δf
φf |β .
To the premise:
φ∅ ⊢y∅
∨
g∈γ
∃xgφg
we append the sequent:
∨
g∈γ
∃xgφg ⊢y∅ C
to prepare an application of the cut rule and derive the conclusion we want. This latter
sequent is in turn the conclusion of an application of the disjunction elimination rule
from the set of sequents ∃xgφg ⊢y∅ C for each g ∈ γ. To prove each of these, we use
the following instance of the cut rule:
∃xgφg ⊢y∅
∨
h∈γ2,h|1=g
∃xgxh(φg ∧ φh)
∨
h∈γ2,h|1=g
∃xgxh(φg ∧ φh) ⊢y∅ C
∃xgφg ⊢y∅ C
and note that the first sequent on the left is derivable from a premise, and involves
nodes of level 2. This procedure is then repeated to the second sequent on the right,
with further applications of the disjunction elimination rule and the cut rule, and we
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continue the tree proceeding upwards on every sequent containing C, until we reach
all nodes in B. Since each node has finite height, the tree is well founded (i.e., it has
no infinite ascending chains), and since each leaf is either a sequent provable from a
premise or an instance of the disjunction introduction axiom, the tree provides the
proof we wanted.
3.5 Makkai’s theorem
Consider the κ-regular fragment; the syntactic category of a theory over this fragment
is a κ-regular category. If we consider the topos of sheaves over this category with the
regular coverage given by single epimorphisms, the coverage is subcanonical and the
topos is a conservative sheaf model for the theory, as can be proved analogously to
Lemma 2.6.1. We have now:
Proposition 3.5.1. Let κ be a regular cardinal. Then any κ-regular theory of cardi-
nality at most κ has a linear partial Beth model of height κ.
Proof. The proof follows the same pattern as the proof of Theorem 3.1.2, but is sim-
plified in this case because the building covering families over each object A, used
to construct the tree, consist of one element, thereby guaranteeing that the tree con-
structed will be linear. More especifically, the cover over an object A witness if A forces
each of the less than κ many subformulas of the axioms; that is, if the subformula η
is an existential formula ∃α<γxαψ(x0, ...,xα, ...,β)), and A  η(β), we include in the
set of coverings one of the form l : C // A, where we have C  ψ(β0, ...,βα, ...βl) for
some β0, ...,βα, .... In case η is a conjunctive formula or A 1 η(β) we just consider the
identity arrow as a cover. To guarantee that the tree has height κ, we add to the set of
covers over an object identity arrows to the set of building covering families over each
object A until it has cardinality κ.
As a consequence, we immediately get:
Proposition 3.5.2. If κ is a regular cardinal, κ-regular theories of cardinality less than
κ are complete with respect to Set-valued models.
Proof. Again, the proof is similar to that of Proposition 3.1.3. It is enough to prove
that every object in the sheaf model forcing the antecedent φ(α) of a sequent φ ⊢x ψ
also forces the consequent ψ(α) for every tuple α in the domain. We can thus consider
a partial Beth model over a linear tree as above but taking instead as the root of the
tree an object forcing φ(α), and including in the set of subformulas of the axioms also
subformulas in the valid sequent φ ⊢x ψ (we call this set of subformulas S). Consider
the directed colimit D of all the underlying structures in the nodes of the tree; we then
make it into a structure with the expected definition and prove that it is a model of
the theory. For this, we prove that given any κ-regular formula φ(x0, ..., xλ, ...) ∈ S,
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we have D  φ(α0, ..., αλ, ...) if and only if for some node n in the linear tree, the
underlying structure Cn satisfies Cn  φ(α0, ..., αλ, ...) for some representatives αi of αi
(the regularity of κ is used in the definition of the structure in D and in the inductive
step for conjunctions). Finally, since any κ-regular formula satisfied in the models
given by the directed colimits of the underlying structures of the nodes in the linear
trees, is forced at their roots (as can be seen by an application of the dependent choice
property), the result follows.
Proposition 3.5.2 can be improved by removing the restriction on the cardinality of
the theories in question, which leads us to a result of [Mak90]:
Theorem 3.5.3. (Makkai) If κ is a regular cardinal, κ-regular theories are complete
with respect to Set-valued models.
Proof. Suppose that the sequent φ ⊢x ψ is valid in every model of a certain theory
but not provable. Then it is not provable in any subtheory of cardinality less than
κ. Therefore, if we add to the language new constants c and axioms ⊤ ⊢ φ(c) and
ψ(c) ⊢ ⊥, any subtheory of cardinality less than κ together with these two new axioms
has, by Proposition 3.5.2, a model. Now we can build a model for the whole theory by
an usual reduced product construction using each of the models so far available, but
where we only use a κ-complete filter instead of an ultrafilter (which will be enough
for our purposes since we do not have disjunction among the connectives). To do so,
suppose the cardinality of the theory is λ, and define Pκ(λ) = {x ⊆ λ : |x| < κ}. For
each x ∈ Pκ(λ) let Mx be a model for the axioms in x. Now notice that the set:
{{x ∈ Pκ(λ) : y ⊆ x} : y ∈ Pκ(λ)}
generates a κ-complete filter F on Pκ(λ) by the regularity of κ. Then we can define a
model for the whole theory as the reduced product Πx∈Pκ(λ)Mx/F . The usual proof
of  Los´ theorem can be adapted for the κ-regular case with the filter F (the use of
an ultrafilter is in the inductive step showing that disjunctive subformulas satisfy the
theorem, and so it is not needed here). This provides a model for the original theory
where φ ⊢x ψ is not valid.
Remark 3.5.4. In the particular case when κ = ω, Theorem 3.5.3 reduces to the
completeness theorem for regular logic. As it happens with coherent logic, the proof
given is thus an alternative path to the usual categorical treatment of Henkinization
from [Joh02].
3.6 Fourman-Grayson theorem
In [FG82], the completeness of countably axiomatized geometric propositional theories
was proven. Here we check that the general case, where we include also existential
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quantification, is deduced from the same techniques employed so far in the completeness
theorems, and at this point it only needs to be outlined. We have:
Theorem 3.6.1. Countable geometric theories are complete with respect to Set-valued
models.
Proof. The proof follows the same lines as the proof for Proposition 3.1.3, except
that building covering families over each object A, used to construct the tree, wit-
ness if A forces each of the (countably many) antecedents and consequents of the
axioms or of the valid sequent φ ⊢x ψ; that is, if an antecedent or consequent η is a
(nonempty) disjunction of the form
∨
i<γ ∃x0...xniψi(x0, ...,xni ,β), and A  η(β), we
include in the set of coverings one of the form lj : Cj // A, where for each j we have
Cj  ψij (β
j
0, ...,β
j
nij
,βlj) for some ij and some β
j
0, ...,β
j
nij
. In case η is ⊥, or η is a
conjunctive subformula, or A 1 η(β) we just consider the identity arrow as a cover.
This guarantees that the tree that we will use to build the partial Beth model will have
countable height (although its branching type could be quite high), and the structures
built as the filtered colimits of underlying structures in a cofinal branch will be (pos-
sibly exploding) positive geometric models of the theory. Finally, since any geometric
formula satisfied in the models given by the directed colimits of the underlying struc-
tures of the nodes along all cofinal branches, is forced at some node of every branch, an
application of the categorical property corresponding to the rule TTω (itself provable
in geometric logic, with the same proof sketched in the proof of Corollary 3.4.4) proves
that the consequent of the valid sequent is forced at the roots, and the completeness
result follows.
Remark 3.6.2. Theorem 3.6.1 is best possible in terms of the cardinality of the theories.
Indeed, given an ω1-Aronszajn tree, the theory of a cofinal branch there ( cf. proof of
Proposition 3.2.2), is obviously geometric and of cardinality ω1, but although consistent,
it has no model.
3.7 Future work
Besides finding the exact strength of Heyting cardinals and the disjunction and ex-
istence properties within the large cardinal hierarchy, another aspect which was not
considered here is the question of whether conceptual completeness results could be
established, or to what extent the category of models of a given theory determines the
theory, up to κ-pretopos completion. Conceptual completeness theorems were obtained
in [MR77], and Makkai provided an even stronger result in [Mak87], by proving that
the category of models of a theory could be endowed with certain structure whose study
would allow to recover the theory. Awodey and Forssell provided in [AF13] a different
approach by considering a topological structure on the category of models. Neither
of these approaches has been generalized to the infinitary first-order case, although
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Makkai gave in [Mak90] an answer for the infinitary regular fragment. It is therefore a
natural step first to try to obtain conceptual completeness theorems for the infinitary
first-order case, and second, to identify which type of structure could be given to the
category of models to be able to recover the theory, possibly using some large cardinal
assumptions.
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